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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH
POLICY: UNDERSTANDING
MEDICAID'S FAILURE
Barak D. Richmant
This Article employs a behavioral economic analysis to understand why
Medicaid has failed to improve the health outcomes of its beneficiaries. It
begins with a formal economic model of health care consumption and then
systematically incorporates a survey of psychosocial variables to formulate
explanations for persistent health disparities. This methodology suggests that
consulting the literature in health psychology and intertemporal decision the-
ory-empirical sources generally excluded from orthodox economic analy-
sis-provides valuable material to explain certain findings in health
econometrics. More significantly, the lessons from this behavioral economic
approach generate useful polity considerations for Medicaid policymakers,
who largely have neglected psychosocial variables in implementing a health
insurance program that rests chiefly on orthodox economic assumptions.
The Article's chief contributions include an expansion of the behavioral
economic approach to include a host of variables in health psychology, a
behavioral refinement of empirical health economics, a behavioral critique of
Medicaid policy, and a menu of suggested Medicaid reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
The plight of Americans without health insurance has been a
popular call to arms for politicians, and demands for expanded cover-
age for the uninsured continue today.' Salient stories abound about
working families who cannot afford health insurance and live in fear
of a work-limiting injury,2 small businesses that struggle to meet rising
I Among the recent efforts to expand health insurance is Cover the Uninsured, a pro-
ject headed by the Robert WoodJohnson Foundation that includes labor, business, philan-
thropic, and health care professional leaders. SeeAbout the Week, Cover the Uninsured, at
http://covertheuninsurcdweek.org/about (last visited Dec. 19, 2004). This effort aims to
reverse the increase in the population of uninsured Americans by "elevating this issue on
the national and local agendas, educating Americans about the problem and providing
immediate assistance to the uninsured and small business owners." Id. The HenryJ. Kaiser
Family Foundation, the American College of Physicians, and numerous state-based organi-
zations, like California's 100% Campaign, are leading similar public campaigns. See Health
Care & the Uninsured, Kaiser Family Foundation, at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/in-
dex.cfm (last visited Dec. 19, 2004); Where We Stand: Access to Care, American College of
Physicians, at http://wwwacponline.org/hpp/menu/access.htm (last visited Dec. 19,
2004); About the 100% Campaign, 100% Campaign, at http://www.100percentcampaign.
org/about-us.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
2 Shawn Hegdal, an uninsured mother of four from Bozeman, MT, writes:
My husband is a self-employed logger. Logging is one of the most danger-
ous professions in the United States. But it's not just his physical health I
worry about-it's also our family's well being. We have no health insur-
ance. If Greg is injured and can't work, we would be wiped out. I don't
know what we would do.
About the Issue: Personal Stories, Cover the Uninsured, at http://covertheuninsuredweek.
org/stories (last visited Mar. 2004).
[Vol. 90:705
2005] BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH POLICY 707
insurance premiums,3 and uninsured individuals who die from treata-
ble illnesses.4 Policymakers first responded to such stories in 1965
with the establishment of Medicaid, 5 a program designed to provide
health insurance to poor families who satisfied the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) eligibility requirements. 6 The next
three decades saw numerous expansions of the Medicaid program, in-
cluding the extension of Medicaid benefits to the elderly and disabled
poor in 1972 (with the establishment of the Supplemental Security
Income program),7 to pregnant women and their infants beginning
3 Nancy Potter writes:
For nearly 25 years, I owned a bakery in the tiny farming town of New Gla-
rus, Wisconsin, population 2,000. I had about 20 employees and became
close to all of them over the years. So it was with great heartache that I had
to announce in the fall of 2000 that we could no longer provide health
insurance for our workers. We had received a notice that our health insur-
ance provider was leaving our region. When we sought coverage from
other companies, even the least expensive quotes we received represented a
180 percent increase in annual premiums. That meant we would have had
to pay an additional $50,000 each year to continue offering coverage. With
annual gross sales of about $650,000, we simply couldn't afford such an
increase.
Id.
4 Susan Garrett, RN, a nurse in Brandywine, MD, writes:
Have you ever looked into the eyes of a child after telling his desperately ill
mother that you couldn't help her? I have. It was the most horrible experi-
ence of my life... We should be ashamed that, with everything we have to
offer, people who work hard to support their families frequently find that
there is nothing for them when they are sick. Why? Because they can't af-
ford health insurance.
Id.
5 Title XIX of the Social Security Act authorizes federal funds to establish a state-
federal cooperative program authorizing medical assistance programs for the poor. See
Amendments to Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1396 (2000)). When President Johnson signed the Medicare and Medicaid Bill
(Title XVIII and Title XIX of the Social Security Act) on July 30, 1965, he remarked, "we
marvel not simply at the passage of this bill but what we marvel at is that it took so many
years to pass it." Remarks with President Truman at the Signing in Independence of the
Medicare Bill, 2 PuB. PAPERS 811, 812 (July 30, 1965), available at http://ww.ssa.gov/his-
tory/lbjstmts.htrnl#medicare.
6 Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program. States develop individual Medi-
caid budgets based on their own eligibility standards and benefits coverage, and then fed-
eral matching funds supplement state budgetary expenditures based on a formula that
depends on a state's median family income. State participation is voluntary, but states that
elect to administer the program (all of them do, and all of them always have) must have
their plans comply with certain nominal federal requirements. See Frew ex rel. Frew v. Haw-
kins, 540 U.S. 431, 433-36 (2004). The AFDC program was renamed "Temporary Assis-
tance for Needy Families" ("TANF") by the Welfare Reform Law of 1996. See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996).
7 Pub. L. No. 92-603, Title III, § 301, 86 Stat. 1465 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1381 (2000)).
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in 1986,8 and shortly afterwards to all children from families below the
federal poverty level.9
Unfortunately, these very considerable legislative efforts have
been misguided. To be sure, Medicaid programs have succeeded in
providing access to medical care for many low-income Americans. In
2002, for example, the program provided health coverage to 50 mil-
lion Americans, including 25 million children, 13 million low-income
adults with children, eight million individuals with disabilities, and
five million seniors.l'
But providing access to health care means little if it does not pro-
duce substantial improvements in health, and after nearly four de-
cades of Medicaid, with annual spending that reached $247.7 billion
in 2002,11 there remains a strong correlation in the United States be-
tween income and health-even for those covered by Medicaid and
other public programs. The poor continue to suffer from higher mor-
tality rates, experience higher morbidity, and self-report significantly
less-healthy lives than their middle and upper class counterparts.' 2
8 Most of these expansions occurred through Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRENATAL CARE: EARLv SUCCESS IN ENROLLING WOMEN
MADE ELIGIBIF BY MEDICAID ExPANSIONs 7-8 (1991) (discussing the federal expansions of
Medicaid coverage for pregnant women and the subsequent state expansions); see alsoJohn
D. Klemm, Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 105, 106-11 (2000)
(tracing reforms of the Medicaid program from 1966 through 1999).
q See Klemm, supra note 8, at 108-09. It is worth noting that these Medicaid expan-
sions may have caused some adverse consequences for the beneficiaries the program origi-
nally targeted in 1965. In 2002, children and adults in TANF-eligible families comprised
75% of Medicaid beneficiaries but received only 30% of Medicaid funds, whereas the non-
elderly disabled and elderly constituted 16% and 9% of Medicaid's beneficiaries, respec-
tively, and received 43% and 27% of Medicaid funds. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAIr
AND THE UNINSIURFD, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT
A GLANCE 1 Fig. 2 (2004), at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2004-04.cfm [hereinafter THE
MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE]. Since Medicaid is a discretionary expenditure for both
the federal and state governments, budgetary pressures have forced reductions in per-ben-
eficiary expenditures on the program, and in some States the program's funds are even
directed away from the originally-targeted beneficiaries. See VERNON SMITH ET AL., KAISER
COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FOUNDATION, STATES
RESPOND TO FISCAL PRESSURE: A 50-STATE UPDATE OF STATE MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH
AND COST CONTAINMENT ActIONs 3-8, 12 (2004), at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/
upload/30453 l.pdf.
10 THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, stipra note 9, at 1.
11 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 2003 DATA COMPENDIUM 3 (2003), at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/current. This figure in-
cludes both state and federal computable benefit payments. Id. Approximately 69% of
Medicaid funds go to the non-elderly poor. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
PROGRAM INFORMATION ON MEDICAID & STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 14
(2004), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/charts/medicaid/InfoMedicaid-schip.pdf.
12 The correlation between income and mortality, for example, is quite substantial. A
1995 study observed that, even when controlling for education, employment, and other
demographics, individuals under 65 with family incomes of greater than $50,000 exper-
ienced mortality rates more than 30% lower than similarly aged individuals with family
incomes of less than $5,000. Paul D. Sorlie et al., US Mortality By Economic, Demographic, and
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Researchers thoroughly documented this correlation in the 100 years
prior to the passage of the Medicaid Bill in 1965,13 and the correlation
has remained robust-and disparities have in fact increased-through
the 1980s and 1990s despite the several decades of legislative accom-
plishments. 14 Moreover, while class-based health inequalities have
been observed in nearly all industrialized nations, the United States is
home to the greatest disparities. 15 Although extending health insur-
ance to the poor undoubtedly resolves some health problems,1 6 the
core inequality remains.1 7 Public debates and legislative efforts have
Social Characteristics: The National Longitudinal Mortality Study, 85 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 949,
951-52 tbl. 2 (1995). Other studies reveal that the impact of income on health is greater at
lower incomes, whereas education has a more significant effect on mortality at higher in-
comes. Eric Backlund et al., A Comparison of the Relationships of Education and Income with
Mortality: The National Longitudinal Mortality Study, 49 Soc. Se. & MED. 1373, 1377 (1999).
For an overview of the positive correlation between wealth and health, see generally James
P. Smith, Healthy Bodies and Thick Wallets: The Dual Relation Between Health and Economic
Status, 13 J, ECON. PERSP. 145 (1999).
Some scholars, particularly social psychologists, instead focus on the positive correla-
tion between health and socioeconomic status (SES), a composite measure of income, edu-
cation, and occupation. See generally Nancy E. Adler Ct al., Socioeconomic Status and Health:
The Challenge of the Gradient, 49 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 15 (1994) (discussing the correlation
between health behaviors, socioeconomic status, and health outcomes).
1- See, e.g., Aaron Antonovsky, Social Class, Life Expectancy, and Overall Mortality, 45
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 31 (1967); Rollo H. Britten, Mortality Rates By Occupational
Class in the United States, 49 PUBLic HEALTH REP. 1101 (1934); Charles V. Chapin, Deaths
Among Taxpayers and Non-Taxpayers: Income Tax, Providence, 1865, 14 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 647
(1924).
14 See Adler et al., supra note 12, at 15-16;Jacob J. Feldman et al., National Trends in
Educational Differentials in Mortality, 129 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 919, 923-28 (1989) (discuss-
ing inverse correlation found between educational attainment and mortality); Gregory
Pappas et al., The Increasing Disparity in Mortality Between Socioeconomic Groups in the United
States, 1960 and 1986, 329 N~w ENG. J. MED. 103, 103 (1993); Smith, supra note 12, at
146-49. What is particularly striking about the persistence of these health and mortality
disparities over time is that they cover a period in which the relative prevalence of different
causes of death has changed dramatically. See, e.g., Abdel R. Omran, A Century of Epidemio-
logic Transition in the United States, 6 PREVENTIVE MED. 30, 40-43 (1977).
15 See Anton E. Kunst & Johann P. Mackenbach, The Size of Mortality Differences Associ-
ated with Educational Level in Nine Industrialized Countries, 84 AM.J. PuB. HEALTH 932, 935 tbl.
3 (1994) (finding that disparities in mortality rates between men ages 35-44 of different
education levels was higher in the United States than in the eight other European coun-
tries in the study, and that mortality rate disparities for olden men in the United States
were matched only by those of France).
16 Extending insurance most easily addresses the specific problem where a poor indi-
vidual suffers from a treatable chronic condition, such as diabetes, schizophrenia, and cer-
tain heart conditions. There is little systematic research that quantifies the frequency of
this problem, but there is substantial anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., All Things Considered.
Indiana's Medicaid Program (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 26, 2001) (reporting that an Indiana
state rule regarding Medicaid eligibility denied coverage for treatment of curable disabili-
ties and led to several avoidable deaths).
17 Moreover, there is additional evidence that the legislative efforts underpinning
Medicaid expansions have failed even to accomplish what they were designed to do. De-
spite its hefty budget, Medicaid has not kept up with the growing pool of the uninsured. In
2002, for example, 43.3 million Americans-or 17% of the non-elderly population, includ-
ing 9.3 million children-were without health insurance. KAISER COMMSSION ON MEDICAn
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fretted over insurance when instead they should have focused on
health.18
This Article argues that Medicaid's failure to mitigate America's
health disparities along class lines reflects, in part, policymakers' poor
understanding of the behavioral component of health care consump-
tion. Throughout the three-decade legislative history of expanding
medical coverage for the poor, Congress's core policy strategy has es-
sentially remained the same: Medicaid and its tributaries amount to
an insurance program for medical care. 19 The umbrella of Medicaid
programs supplies beneficiaries with insurance coverage for certain
services provided by medical professionals, and as eligible individuals
seek care at approved facilities, state and federal funds reimburse
providers. This policy fails to appreciate that health care and health
insurance are unlike other forms of government assistance, such as
food stamps or welfare checks, that supply beneficiaries with commod-
ities that offer immediate enjoyment. The translation of health insur-
ance into better health is far less reliable than the corresponding
conversion of welfare checks into income or food stamps into
nourishment.
AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER
2, 4 (2003), at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/29345-l.pdf. The pool of unin-
sured children is largely the result of eligible individuals failing to enroll in Medicaid pro-
grams, since nearly all of the 9.3 million uninsured children are eligible for public
insurance. This suggests that targeted beneficiaries are not behaving in ways predicted by
Medicaid policymakers. See infra Part I.
18 Anotherjustification given for the Medicaid program, in addition to providing cov-
erage and improving health outcomes for the poor, is to reduce the social costs of "job-
lock," which occurs when an employee remains with a certain employer, rather than pursu-
ing other employment opportunities, solely because of the employer-provided health in-
surance, Some scholars have discussed state-sponsored health insurance as a possible
solution to job-lock. See, e.g.,Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and
Job Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job-Lock, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rpv. 86, 100 (1994);
see also Brigitte C. Madrian, Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is There Evi-
dence ofjob-Lock?, 109 Q. J. EcoN. 27 (1994) (finding the job-lock" relationship between
employment and health insurance to be substantial). While some research has examined
the effect of "continuation of coverage" mandates on the preponderance of job-lock, see
Gruber & Madrian, supra, at 89-93, there is little research examining the effect of Medi-
caid. This is because the social costs of job-lock, by definition, relate to the employed
population, and thus the effect of Medicaid on job-lock is unlikely to be significant. In any
event, concerns about job-lock alone, if any, are not enough to proclaim the Medicaid
program a success.
19 Congress's most recent expansion of Medicaid benefits maybe an interesting devia-
tion from this pattern. In 1997, Congress passed the State Children's Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP) which dedicated $40 billion in federal funding over 10 years to expand
coverage for children from low-income households. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-33, Title V, § 4901(a), 111 Sat. 552 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1397
(2000)). SCHIP provides states with considerable latitude in selecting a health insurance
policy strategy and allows states to implement policy strategies beyond simply extending
insurance coverage. See infra notes 272-82 and accompanying text.
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Health care differs from other forms of government assistance in
that it is better viewed not as a commodity for consumption, but
rather as one of many inputs into a health production function.
Health care joins exercise, nutrition, health-related behaviors, and
certain environmental factors as inputs to a "health stock" which, like
education or human capital, individuals accumulate over time and en-
joy in subsequent years. Though larger investments of health inputs
generally lead to larger health stocks, which in turn translate into
longer and more utility-filled lives, each input must be viewed within
the context of the complex health production function and cannot be
viewed in isolation. Consequently, the impact of an individual health
care input depends on other nonmedical, and often behavioral, vari-
ables. Health care is thus best viewed as an investment that combines
with other inputs to generate future utility, not a commodity that reli-
ably yields current utility.20
In viewing health as a function of long-term investments, a behav-
ioral economic approach, in contrast to a traditional analysis that rests
on assumptions of rationality, generates fruitful insights. First, empiri-
cal observations from the fields of health psychology, social psychol-
ogy, and public health reveal that many health-related behaviors,
including health care-seeking behavior and healthy versus unhealthy
behavior, account for much more of the variance in predicting health
outcomes than does access to medical care. These health-related be-
haviors in turn have systematic and robust causal psychosocial factors
that vary according to socioeconomic class. Second, many of these
same psychosocial variables influence the efficacy of a certain medical
intervention, so the marginal impact of certain health care services
will vary according to behavioral circumstances. And third, if consum-
ing health care translates primarily into future (and not current) util-
ity, then one's propensity to seek care will depend on one's valuation
of future utility, which again invokes multiple behavioral considera-
tions. This tradeoff between current and future utility has received
substantial attention from behavioralists and psychologists, and all of
these factors play significant roles in determining health outcomes,
but they escape the orthodox economic analysis and expose a severe
20 One important exception is acute care designed not to cure but to alleviate discom-
fort. Since many uninsured obtain their health services through hospital emergency
rooms, much of the care they receive addresses immediate concerns and does not invest in
future wellness. This is problematic because, among other reasons, the (quite expensive)
care that those uninsured receive does not translate into better health.
To be sure, a majority of medical interventions (including the vast majority of costly
interventions) is designed to improve health, and thus increase future utility, rather than
to improve one's current condition and increase immediate utility. Some scholars argue
that this approach to medicine is wrongheaded. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, WH-IAT KIND OF
LIFE 135-41 (1990) (suggesting that medical care should be oriented towards a "biographi-
cal" life span, after which intervention would be limited to caring rather than curing).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
limitation of a model that assumes maximizing behavior. An under-
standing of the psychosocial variables that explain and predict health
behaviors, and thus good health, could valuably inform health care
policy. 21
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I challenges the conven-
tional presumptions that motivate Medicaid policy, chiefly, that an in-
surance gap is responsible for health disparities. It reports evidence
suggesting that an individual's insurance status is largely a choice vari-
able, and that improving inequalities in insurance status and access to
health care is unlikely to end health disparities. Perhaps more signifi-
cant, disparities in consumption of health care itself-let alone health
insurance-may have little effect on health disparities. This relates to
a broader and increasingly popular claim that the United States over-
consumes health care without enjoying material improvements in
health.22 Thus, a policy geared to improve health by providing health
insurance is doubly flawed.
Part II discusses the health production function developed in
Michael Grossman's seminal 1972 paper,2 3 which was the first effort to
treat health care as an input to a health production function. Though
no theoretical amendments to the Grossman model are offered here,
a review of that paper lays the foundation for a behavioral economic
understanding of health care consumption and articulates how such a
behavioral approach challenges assumptions about health care
consumption.
Part III builds off the Grossman model by identifying causal
mechanisms developed in the health economics literature (and re-
flected in the Grossman model) that articulate how nonmedical in-
puts can influence health outcomes. It then-in what is the Article's
biggest contribution-discusses specific findings from the health psy-
chology literature and identifies specific psychosocial factors that have
been shown to influence health. This is a step that has not yet been
taken in behavioral economics. Previous work has focused on a now-
familiar collection of experimental data that identify behavioral pat-
terns that conflict with economic theory. 24 This Article introduces a
21 In viewing health disparities as, in part, a consequence of social and behavioral
variables, this Article joins a growing literature on social policy that emphasizes social and
environmental inequalities in addition to material inequalities. See, e.g., CONSEQUENCES OF
GROWING UP POOR (GregJ. Duncan & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1997); SusA,, E. MAYER,
WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy- FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN's LIFE CIt UNCES (1997).
22 See infta notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Furthermore, substantial evidence
suggests that the efficacy of health care varies largely on psychosocial variables. See infta
Part III.A.2.
23 Michael Grossman, On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health, 80 J.
POL. ECON. 223 (1972).
24 For an overview of current literature in behavioral law and economics, see BEHAv-
IORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
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new body of empirical findings into behavioral economics by incorpo-
rating experimental and survey research that is specific to healthcare-
seeking behavior. Future work in behavioral economics, whether re-
searching health care or other policy areas, would benefit from ex-
panding the pool of psychological empirics beyond those commonly
found in the current literature.
In highlighting why Medicaid's extension of health insurance is a
failed strategy, Part III also introduces a list of Medicaid reforms that
follow from the behavioral model. These include: developing com-
munity-based health care that encourages trust in providers and offers
social support for individuals struggling with health challenges; initiat-
ing cultural campaigns to change social norms; revising the delivery of
medical services to give patients greater control over their care; and
integrating the delivery of preventive care with counseling support to
encourage farsighted behavior. While these policy proposals are
largely speculative, the overarching theme behind each proposed in-
tervention is that Medicaid policyrnakers should take behavioralism
seriously, and that offering medical care alone is unlikely to benefit a
Medicaid population that suffers from multiple sources of poor
health. Medicaid benefits should be tailored to the sources of poor
health, and supplementing the delivery of medical care with services
that appreciate the behavioral context of poor health could signifi-
cantly improve health outcomes without requiring expensive care.
Part IV then identifies three recently established avenues that
permit states to pursue the Medicaid reforms suggested in Part I1.
The first, and most recent, is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services announcement in 2001 of a liberal approach to granting Sec-
tion 1115 Medicaid waivers. This initiative grants states significant lati-
tude in developing creative health care programs and gives state
executive branches the opportunity to initiate behavioral interven-
tions. The second avenue is the State Children's Health Insurance
Program (SCHIP), passed by Congress in 1997, which reflects policy-
makers' growing inclination toward behavioral interventions.
SCHIP's efforts to improve the health of disadvantaged children in-
clude the provision of flexible funds for demonstration projects,
which can allow and encourage experimentation in behavioral re-
forms. The third avenue is the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagno-
sis, and Treatment program (EPSDT), which opens the door for
judicial interventions that induce states to play proactive and behav-
ior-sensitive roles in delivering health care. The Article concludes by
encouraging policymakers-whether state or federal, whether execu-
tive, legislative or judicial-to depart from the prevailing Medicaid
policy model and to incorporate behavioralism into health improve-
ment programs.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
I
THE POOR, THE SICK, AND THE UNINSURED
The campaign to extend health insurance to America's poor is
motivated by three correlations: many of the poor are uninsured,
25
the uninsured struggle with bad health, 26 and the poor struggle with
bad health. 27 Policymakers tend to see causality in the second correla-
tion-namely, that insurance status determines health outcomes-
and therefore, since the poor cannot afford health insurance, the
public provision of health insurance would presumably correct the
third correlation. Examining each of these three correlations, how-
ever, reveals problems with that policy's underlying logic.
First, for many of the uninsured, it is unlikely that poverty is the
reason they do not have health insurance. Many uninsured individu-
als who are eligible for Medicaid or other forms of public insurance
simply fail to enroll. For example, most of the 9.3 million uninsured
children in the United States are eligible for government-sponsored
health insurance. 28 Similarly, half of California's poor, which by defi-
nition are individuals from households with incomes below 200% of
the federal poverty level (FPL), are eligible for the state's health insur-
ance programs but do not enroll. 29 Regarding the nonpoor unin-
sured, recent data from California reveal that 27% of these families
earn greater than 300% of the FPL, 60% own personal computers,
and 45% own their own homes. 30 These individuals clearly have the
25 Sixty-six percent of America's non-elderly uninsured come from families earning
less than 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and 81% come from families earning less
than 300% FPL. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYJ. KAI-
SER FOUNDATION, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA, 2003 DATA UPDATE HIGH-
LIGHTS: CHARTPACK AND TABLES Fig. 4 (2004), at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/
46814_1.pdf.
26 For a detailed overview of the health disparities between individuals with health
insurance and those without, see AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, No HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE? IT's ENOUGH TO MARE YOU SICK 11-18 (2000), at http://www.acponline.org/unin-
sured/lack-contents.htm. The American College of Physicians and the American Society
of Internal Medicine (ACP-ASIM) have also documented the poor health outcomes of
America's uninsured women and America's uninsured Latino community. Id. at 22-25;
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS-AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, No HEALTH
INSURANCE? IT'S ENOUGH TO MAKE YOU SICK: LATINO COMMUNITY AT GREAT RISK (2000), at
http://ww.acponline.org/uninsured/lack-contents2.htm. These compilations should be
treated with some caution, however, since they were organized specifically to advance the
political push towards expanded coverage.
27 See Adler et al., supra note 12, at 15-16; Smith, supra note 12, at 146-49 (1999);
supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
28 GENEVIEVE M. KENNY ET AL., MOST UNINSURED CHILDREN ARE IN FAMILIES SERVED BY
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (Urban Institute, Assessing the New Federalism Series No. B-4,
1999), at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309302.
29 Mark Smith, Keynote Presentation I, in CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC HOsPI-
TALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, THE UNINSURED DEBATE: HEALTH INSURANCE VS. HEALTH CARE
ACCESS 3, 6 (2000), at http://ww.caph.org/publications/uninsured.pdf.
30 Id.
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resources to make significant purchases in health care, yet they
choose to make other expenditures instead. These consumer deci-
sions may be defensible under certain circumstances. Perhaps many
of these potential health insurance purchasers are healthy and un-
likely to get sick in the short term, or perhaps they know they can rely
on charity care. Similarly, perhaps these individuals are experiencing
income fluctuations, short-term cash shortages, or uncertain future in-
come, and thus their current income overstates their actual budgets.
Such supposition is speculative and requires further examination, but
what can safely be said is that they have assets or income that make
available the option to purchase some sort of health insurance, and
yet they decline that option."' For these individuals, insurance status
is a choice variable much more than an unavoidable consequence of
poverty.
Even if uninsured individuals were offered publicly-sponsored
health insurance, there is conflicting evidence that a change in insur-
ance status would lead to improved health outcomes. To be sure, an
army of studies document that the uninsured are at greater risk to a
host of adverse health outcomes. Uninsured Americans are more
likely to suffer from avoidable hospitalizations, 32 to suffer higher rates
of hospital-related or clinical mortality, 3  and to experience higher
rates of late-stage cancer diagnosis (and subsequently have lower can-
cer survival rates)."'4 However, publicly provided health insurance has
31 See id. ("[There are] people for whom the 'market' should work; they 'should' buy
health insurance-and don't .... That is to say, their sense of the value of what they can
'afford' says health insurance is not high on their list.").
32 SeeJohn Billings et al., Recent Findings on Preventable Hospitalizations, 15 HEALTH AFF.
239, 239 (1996); Andrew B. Bindman et al., Preventable Hospitalizations and Access to Care,
274 JAMA 305, 305 (1995) (finding that increased access to care was inversely related to
hospitalization rates for certain chronic conditions);Joel S. Weissman et al., Rates of Avoida-
ble Hospitalization By Insurance Status in Massachusetts and Maryland, 268 JAMA 2388, 2388
(1992) (finding that uninsured patients were significantly more likely to be hospitalized for
avoidable conditions).
33 See Peter Franks et al., Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from a National Cohort,
270JAMA 737, 740 (1993) (finding that the effect of lack of insurance on mortality was
comparable to the effects of education, income and self-rated health); Jack Hadley et al.,
Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients: Conditions on Admission, Re-
source Use, and Outcome, 265 JAMA 374, 374 (1991) (finding, inter alia, that the uninsured
had a 44% to 124% higher risk of in-hospital mortality at the time of admission than did
the privately insured); Paul D. Sorlie et al., Mortality in the Uninsured Compared with That in
Persons with Public and Private Health Insurance, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2409, 2413
(1994).
14 SeeJohn Z. Ayanian et al., The Relation Between Health Insurance Coverage and Clinical
Outcomes Among Women with Breast Cancer, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 326, 326 (1993) ("Unin-
sured patients and those covered by Medicaid presented with more advanced disease than
did privately insured patients."); Richard G. RoetZheim et al., Effects of Health Insurance and
Race on Early Detection of Cancer, 91 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1409, 1413 (1999) (persons who
were uninsured were significantly more likely to be diagnosed at a late stage of cancer than
were patients with private insurance).
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been no talisman. Even after Medicaid began covering large popula-
tions of the poor, low-income households, on average, have continued
to suffer disproportionately bad health. 35
Part of this persistent health disparity can be attributed to the
inadequacy of Medicaid's coverage. Access to care certainly varies by
economic status, and many low-income individuals experience logisti-
cal difficulty in obtaining care. 3 6 In addition, many states set reim-
bursements for Medicaid services far below the rates that providers
receive from private insurance or Medicare, 7 and some states limit
access to care by imposing burdensome bureaucratic hurdles.38 Thus,
despite a theoretically generous benefits plan, Medicaid often does
not reach its intended beneficiaries.
However, there is skepticism that access barriers-whether a nat-
ural product of the health care market, a result of Medicaid's poor
administration, or intentionally erected by the state-are responsible
for the failure of public health insurance to lead to better health out-
comes. Though it is plausible that enrollment rates among eligible
uninsured-which for some populations are surprisingly low--could
35 See Smith, supra note 12, at 148 (noting that while the poor have experienced some
health improvements since Medicaid's beginnings in the 1960s, "Medicaid apparently
failed to make much of a dent on health disparities by economic status"). For a compre-
hensive overview of health inequalities from a cross-national perspective, see HEALTH INE-
QUALITIES: LivEcouRsE APPROACHES (George Davey Smith ed., 2003).
36 The data reflecting disparities in access across economic classes is overwhelming.
See, e.g., JOHN HOLAHAN & BRENDA SPILLMAN, HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR UNINSURED ADULTS:
A STRONG SAFETY NET IS NOT THE SAME AS INSURANCE 5-6 (Urban Institute, Assessing the
New Federalism, 1998), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310414-anf
b42.pdf; see also JACK A. MEYER & SHARON SILOW-CARROLL, W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION,
INCREASING ACCESS: BUILDING WOI5NG SOLUTIONS 3 (2000) (concluding that a "host of
logistic, cultural, and organizational noninsurance barriers to care must be overcome to
meet the needs of patients as they try to gain access to the system"), at http://www.commu-
nityvoices.org/Uploads/lqzxc5fltm3ttrqh5sqrm l45-20020826091522.pdf (last visited Dec.
19, 2004). Studies examining regional variation in health care access for the uninsured
suggest that a region's concentration of providers, health expenditures of wealthy patients,
and ethnic heterogeneity can affect health care access for the region's uninsured. See Pe-
ter J. Cunningham & Peter Kemper, Ability to Obtain Medical Care for the Uninsured, 280
JAMA 921, 925-26 (1998). Additional evidence suggests that individuals who own automo-
biles, even when controlling for employment grade, cxhibit lower mortality rates. See
George Davey Smith et al., Magnitude and Causes of Socioeconomic Differentials in Mortality:
Further Evidence from the Whitehall Study, 44 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY HEALTH 265
(1990). For an overview of indicators of access to health care in the United States, see
LEYU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, DELIVERING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
500-01 (1998).
57 SeeJohn Holahan et al., The Impact of Medicaid Adoption of the Medicare Fee Schedule, 14
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 11, 11 (1993) ("[L] ow Medicaid fees result in low physician partici-
pation in the program and affect the number of Medicaid patients physicians are willing to
treat.").
38 SeeJosEPH WHITE, COMPETING SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN HEALTH CARE PROPOSALS AND
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 38 (1995) ("[S]tates seem to discourage application for the
program by requiring potential beneficiaries to complete complex application forms.").
39 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
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reflect administrative access barriers, Mark Smith, CEO of California
HealthCare Foundation, has a sharp retort for those who make that
claim:
Now, please understand. I understand there are a variety of reasons
why people do not sign up for Medi-Cal and Healthy Families.
They're afraid of the INS. The form is not in Hmong. They don't
understand insurance. The form is too long, too difficult to fill out.
They don't like going to the welfare department. . . . And yet, I
would argue to you, if there were a million low-income Californians
that were eligible for $2,000 a year in cash, how much "outreach" do
you think we'd have to do? . . . Are you kidding me? Many of us
have struggled our whole lives to pass bills to give the poor what
they desperately need. We tend to think that the reason they're not
battering down the door is simply that we haven't yelled loud
enough or in the right language. This is an illusion.
40
More fundamentally, many scholars argue that differentials in ac-
cess to health care are not responsible for the marked inequality in
health outcomes, as health disparities have been shown to persist even
under conditions of equal access. 4 1 For example, the famous "White-
hall Studies" observed health differences across class and income
among civil servants in England and Wales even though all of the sub-
jects enjoyed equal medical insurance coverage under Britain's Na-
tional Health Service. 42 In addition, the Rand Health Insurance
Experiment (HIE) found that while lower co-payments for health care
led to higher utilization of health care services, those increases in utili-
zation did not measurably improve health outcomes, save for the sick
poor.43 These results have led some prominent health researchers to
40 Smith, supra note 29, at 6.
41 See Smith, supra note 12, at 148 ("[T]here is growing skepticism that differential
access to health care is the smoking gun behind the health gradient.").
42 The first Whitehall Study was reported in M.G. Marmot et al., Social/Economic Status
and Disease, 8 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 111 (1987) [hereinafter Whitehall I]. A follow-up
study, or "Whitehall II," generated similar results in M.G. Marmot et al., Health Inequalities
Among British Civil Servants: The Whitehall 11 Study, 337 LANCET 1387 (1991) [hereinafter
Whitehall I1]. What is remarkable about these findings is that they reveal a linear relation-
ship between health outcomes and social class across all social classes-in other words, a
one-level promotion within the British Civil Service translated into a steady and significant
improvement in health regardless of where the promotion took place. See Whitehall 1,
supra, at 113 tbl. 1; WhitehallI, supra, at 1389 tbl. 1; see also Patricia Cohen, Forget Lonely. Life
is Healthy at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2004, at B9 ("Whitehall shook the public health
establishment. 'Those findings caused me to change my career' said [Nancy] Adler [a lead-
ing health psychologist] . . . 'It was so dramatic and so puzzling."').
For similar findings from British census data, see A. M. Adelstein, Life-Style in Occupa-
tional Cancer, 6J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 953 (1980), which found an inverse rela-
tion between cancer rates and social class, and MERVYN SUSSER ET AL., SOCIOLOGY IN
MEDICINE 236-41 (1985).
43 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 338-45 (1993) (summarizing the HIE's central findings).
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argue that health care actually has only a slight impact on health out-
comes. Victor Fuchs, who has made the argument most prominently,
notes that public health initiatives, not technological advances in
health care, were responsible for health improvements in the United
States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 4 4 He further
argues that the marginal benefits from improvements in health care,
at least above certain minimum technological levels, are far below
those from improvements in individuals' decisions about diet, exer-
cise, and risky behaviors. 45 Other scholars have similarly observed
that even though the United States spends more per capita (and more
as a percentage of its GDP) on health care than any other industrial-
ized nation, American life expectancy is only average among OECD
nations and infant mortality is far above the OECD average.4 6 These
data suggest that a policy premised merely on providing better access
to health care-or access to better (usually more expensive) health
care-is misguided, and variables outside health care access are driv-
ing health inequalities.
In sum, current Medicaid policy rests on a severely flawed syllo-
gism. Poverty is not necessarily responsible for the growing number
of uninsured; extending health insurance does not necessarily induce
individuals to enroll in that insurance or to seek medical care that is
covered by that insurance; and making medical care widely available
does not necessarily translate into improved health. At the very least,
this discredits policymakers' presumption that expanding health in-
surance eligibility will improve health outcomes. More importantly, it
discredits the dual presumptions that individuals will consume the
health care they require to achieve good health and that the policy-
makers' responsibility is only to make such care available. This poses a
challenge to a traditional, rational-basis understanding of health care
consumption because the evidence suggests that variables other than
access to, or consumption of, health care have more power in predict-
ing health outcomes. The search for these variables begins with a
comprehensive economic model of the demand for health and health
care, discussed in the next Part, followed by a survey of behavioral
variables that can provide insight into the efficacy of certain health
care policies.
44 VICTOR R. FucHls, Wtlo SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE 30-39
(1998).
45 Id. at 54-55.
46 See, e.g., HENRYJ. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION: FINANCING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE 78-92 (1991).
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II
THE GROSSMAN MODE.
Michael Grossman's seminal 1972 paper was the first to model
the demand for health care within a health production function.
4 7
While the paper is famous for its formal modeling of health care con-
sumption and has served as the paradigmatic model for many subse-
quent empirical studies,4 8 it also can be used to identify how
psychosocial variables influence health outcomes.
Grossman's modeling of health care consumption followed the
efforts of his contemporaries at the University of Chicago to model
investments in human capital. 49 Human capital models of household
production introduced a distinction between "commodities" (alterna-
tively termed "objects of fundamental choice"), which provide con-
sumers with immediate utility upon consumption, and "market
goods," which consumers use as inputs to produce utility-generating
commodities. ,50 The consumption of certain market goods, such as
education, increases a person's stock of human capital, such as knowl-
edge or marketable skills, that later leads to higher productivity (and
thus a higher income).51 While some earlier publications modeled an
individual's health to be one component of the stock of human capi-
tal, 52 the Grossman paper was the first to model a unique demand
function for heath capital.
47 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 224; see also MICHAEL GROSSMAN, THE DEMAND FOR
HFALTH: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION (1972); Smith, supra note 12, and
accompanying text. For an overview of the impact of Grossman's 1972 paper, see Michael
Grossman, The Human Capital Model, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 349-51
(Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000) [hereinafter Grossman, Human
Capital].
48 See Smith, supra note 12, at 148. For empirical support for the Grossman model
using cross-sectional data, see, e.g., Manfred Erbsland et al., Health, Health Care, and the
Environment: Econometric Evidence from German Micro Data, 4 HEALTH ECON. 169 (1995);
Thomas Stratmann, What Do Medical Services Buy? Effects of Doctor Visits on Work Day Loss, 25
E. ECON. J. 1 (1999); Adam Wagstaff, The Demand for Health: Some New Empirical Evidence, 5J.
HEALTH ECON. 195 (1986). For empirical support using longitudinal data, see, e.g., EDDY
KA. VAN DOORSLAER, HEALTH, KNOWLEDGE, AND THE DEMAND FOR MEDICAL CARE (Van
Gorcum 1987); Adam Wagstaff, The Demand for Health: An Empirical Reformulation of the
Grossman Model, 2 HEALTH ECON. 189 (1993).
49 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Allocation of Time, 75 EcON. J. 493 (1965); Kelvin J.
Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966); Robert T.
Michael & Gary S. Becker, On the New Theory of Consumer Behavior, 75 SWEDISHJ. ECON. 378
(1973).
5o See Lancaster, supra note 49, at 132-33.
51 See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 11-13 (1993); GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN
CAPITAL AND THE PERSONAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: AN ANALYTICAL APPROACH 37-39
(1967);JACoB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS 129-32 (1974); Yoram Ben-
Porath, The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle ofEarnings, 75 J. POL. ECON. 352,
352 (1967).
52 See Victor R. Fuchs, The Contribution of Health Services to the American Economy, 44
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 65 (1966); SandraJ. Mushkin, Health as Investment, 70J. POL.
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The Grossman model begins with the basic premise that an indi-
vidual is happier when she is healthy-i.e., health translates into util-
ity. This health-related happiness is a function of a health stock that
an individual builds over time with appropriate health investments. 53
Formally, an individual's intertemporal utility is characterized by:
U = Y_,[r'U,(ht,Z,)] t = 0, 1 ..... n
where Z, is consumption of standard commodities, h, represents the
number of healthy hours in period t, and r7 (0 < q < 1) discounts fu-
ture utilities. The model further defines h t = (ItH t where HI is the
"stock of health" at period t and Ot is an exogenous (positive) parame-
ter that defines the relationship between an individual's health stock
and the number of healthy hours (and subsequent utility) she enjoys.
The most interesting feature of Grossman's model, and the most
useful for the purposes of this Article, is his characterization of an
individual's health stock:
Ht+1 - Ht = It - tHt
where 6t (0 < 8t < 1) is the depreciation rate of the health stock and 1
is the gross.investment in the health stock during period t. I, is de-
fined by It = It(M,;E) where M, is a vector of inputs that contribute to
gross investment in health, such as health care, exercise, and other
inputs that require either time or financial resources.5 4 E is the con-
sumer's stock of knowledge, or human capital exclusive of health capi-
tal, and its inclusion in the health investment equation reflects
Grossman's assumption that knowledge capital raises the efficiency of
the production process of human capital, similar to how technology
improvements increase production efficiency in the market sector.55
So Grossman's model posits that an individual's health is a function of
her genetic make-up (included in the rate of health depreciation, 6,,
and the initial health stock of Ho), her independent decisions regard-
ECON. 129, 136 (1962). The problem with these models, as Grossman observes, is that they
fail to treat an individual's health capital differently from any other type of human capital.
Grossman, supra note 23, at 224. The Grossman model illustrates, however, that health
capital has certain unique attributes (including depreciation, which has implications for an
individual's length of life, and thus expected utility), and thus deserves a different model.
Id.
53 This is a simplified version of the original Grossman model. Cf Grossman, supra
note 23, at 225. Grossman also includes a time-budget constraint where an individual's
time is an input in creating both her health stock and the other commodities she con-
sumes. Id. at 226-27. The healthier an individual, the less time she loses to sickness, and
correspondingly, the more time she can dedicate to productive, consumption-creating ac-
tivities. Therefore, an individual's health also indirectly influences her utility because a
healthier individual can spend more time earning wages and creating other commodities
for consumption. See id. at 227.
54 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 226.
55 This is an assumption that was common to household capital models. See Robert T.
Michael, Education in Nonmarket Production, 81 J. POL. ECON. 306, 307 (1973); Michael &
Becker, supra note 49, at 381.
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ing resource allocation (reflected in the assets she chooses to expend
on M health investments and E investments in education), and cer-
tain environmental factors (also captured in E).56
Since its introduction in 1972, Grossman's model has been cited
widely and has enjoyed robust empirical support.57 It has been la-
beled "the standard economic model of health," 58 and it illustrates a
comprehensive approach towards the production of health, where
health is a stock where current inputs and chosen behaviors are in-
vestments producing increments to that stock. If these increments
are affected by current choices, solving sequentially, today's health
stock will be a function of the entire history of all current and past
prices, incomes, health behaviors, and initial health endowments.
59
Accordingly, the model introduces an army of variables that cause
good health, and only one of those variables is consumption of health
care.
Within the complete set of health-improving variables, this Article
focuses on the variables that relate to an individual's social environ-
ment and behavior-factors that are left out of traditional economics.
The Grossman model invites the incorporation of these psychosocial
factors in two important ways. First, the model states that the effi-
ciency with which individuals consume inputs of health care varies ac-
cording to certain personal characteristics. Grossman states that an
individual's education capital influences her marginal productivity
from a given health-related input, but this could be viewed more
widely as a door through which other psychosocial variables can enter.
The model allows a broad interpretation of the variable E to include
other personal characteristics that affect health outcomes. From this
perspective, E can represent a vector of different personal and envi-
ronmental variables, not just the simple metric reflecting formal edu-
cation. Some variables in E may be complements to health care that
influence the marginal productivity of a certain health care input, and
some may represent the inclination to consume more efficient health
inputs that serve as substitutes for health care. Though Grossman
may have only intended to follow the popular human capital models,
his inclusion of the E variable is a significant innovation in under-
standing the role of behavioral factors in shaping health outcomes. 60
56 The variable for education, E, is considered here as both an investment and an
environmental factor because the causal mechanism from education to health is not
known (or, more precisely, the causality is likely to have multiple paths). The relationship
between health and education is discussed in detail in Part III, infra.
57 See supra note 48.
58 Smith, supra note 12, at 148.
59 Id. at 149.
60 While several human capital models assumed that education increased the produc-
tive efficiency of other inputs, see Michael, supra note 55, at 306; Michael & Becker, supra
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The incorporation of additional psychosocial variables into the formal
model-which is undertaken in Part 11-is a paradigmatic applica-
tion of behavioral economics.
Another useful feature of the Grossman model is the relationship
it establishes between health-related investment decisions and the dis-
counting of future utilities in an intertemporal utility function. When
an individual makes investments in her health stock, which will subse-
quently lead to greater utility in future periods, she must expend time
and resources in the current period and endure a reduced current
utility. Essentially, investing in one's health stock is trading current
utility for future utility, so an individual's health decisions will corre-
spond to the degree to which she discounts future utility and the man-
ner in which she makes investment decisions over time. Even though
Grossman does not explicidy incorporate behavioral variables into this
element of the model, the relationship between the present and the
future invites an appeal to scholarship that identifies psychosocial fac-
tors that shape investment decisions.
These two features of the Grossman model-the E variable and
the centrality of making investment decisions over time-will be the
focus for the remainder of this Article. As the following Part illus-
trates, Grossman's inclusion of education in the health production
function finds robust empirical support, but his model is more signifi-
cant in its allowance for other psychosocial variables, particularly
those that further explain how education could seem to affect health.
In this way, the Grossman model will serve as a useful vehicle to un-
derstand how other personal and social factors can influence health
outcomes and thus inform social policy.
III
INCORPORATING PSYCHOSOCIL VARIABLES
Previous attempts to incorporate behavioral economic variables
into an analysis of health care policy have been limited to applying
certain economic anomalies6 1 that can be applied widely beyond
health care issues. One noteworthy example is Russell Korobkin's use
of behavioral mechanisms-such as bounded rationality, overoptim-
ism, and loss aversion-in arguing for greater patient protection laws
note 49, at 393, education's specific application towards health production is significant.
Perhaps Grossman does not deserve credit for being the first to identify the importance of
noneconomic variables in consumer behavior, but he deserves credit for advancing the
important, yet perhaps less bold, argument that these behavioral variables contribute to
the demand for health and health care. This idea is the antecedent for this Article.
61 For a useful survey of these anomalies and their implications for legal rules, see
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471,
1548-50 (1998).
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in managed care systems. 6 2 Severely lacking, however, are examina-
tions that apply health-specific behavioral variables that health psy-
chologists and public health scholars have shown to significantly affect
health outcomes. 63, These factors could be important in explaining
health behaviors that deviate from orthodox economic predictions in
general, and health disparities between the wealthy and poor in par-
ticular. Consequently, an examination of these psychosocial factors
could inform Medicaid policy's strategy to improve the health of the
poor.
The starting point is Grossman's inclusion of education in the
health production model. A large number of studies illustrate that,
consistent with the Grossman formulation, "years of formal schooling
completed" is the most important correlate of good health and is an
even more powerful predictor than occupation and income.6 Health
may also have a causal influence on the duration of a person's school-
ing,65 and there likely are confounding third variables that systemati-
cally affect both education and health (a topic discussed in the next
62 Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection " Laws: Incomplete
Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44-62 (1999); see
also William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health
Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1710-11 (1999) (critiquing rationales for the promotion of
mandatory disclosure laws in health care).
63 A related literature in economics includes some attempts to explain presumptively
irrational conduct, such as addictive behavior, within rational utility-maximizing models.
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96J. PoL. ECON.
675, 694-95 (1988) (explaining how unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking and other addi-
tive habits, can be utility maximizing within an intertemporal utility function and thus
consistent with the rational actor model). Psychologists have pursued similar efforts to
model addictive behavior, though with methodologies less committed to the rational actor
model. See, e.g., George Lowenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in SMOKING: RISK PER-
CEPTION, & POLICY (Paul Slovic ed., 2001). But academic efforts that use psychosocial data
to inform, and perhaps radically alter, the rational actor model are virtually nonexistent.
See, e.g., RICHARD G. FRANK, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH ECONOMICS (NBER Work-
ing Paper 10881, 2004) ("[Tlhe application of behavioral economics to issues in health
economics have been largely confined to understanding addictive behavior around ciga-
rettes, drugs, and alcohol."), at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10881.pdf.
64 See Richard Auster et al., The Production of Health, an Exploratory Study, 4 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 411, 430-32 & tbls. 1, 3-7 (1969);Joseph Newhouse & Lindy Friedlander, The
Relationship Between Medical Resources and Measures of Health: Some Additional Evidence, 15 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 200, 210, 214 (1980); Pappas et al., supra note 14, at 105-06; Morris
Silver, An Econometric Analysis of Spatial Variations in Mortality Rates By Race and Sex, in ESSAYS
IN THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 161 & tbl. 9-1 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972);
see also empirical studies cited supra note 48.
For a survey of the literature on education and health, see Michael Grossman & Rob-
ert Kaestner, Effects of Education on Health, in THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 67 (]ere
R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997).
65 SeeJanet Currie & Rosemary Hyson, Is the Impact of Health Shocks Cushioned By Socio-
economic Status? The Case of Low Birth Weight, 89 AMER. ECON. REV. 245, 245 (1999) (sug-
gesting that poor health results in less education); Timothy J. Perri, Health Status and
Schooling Decisions of Young Men, 3 EcoN. EDuc. REV. 207, 207 (1984) (same).
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subsection on time preferences).66 But the majority view-which is
not mutually exclusive from the other mechanisms-is that formal ed-
ucation has a discernable causal impact on health.6 7
One may be content to end the examination there. It is possible
to conclude from these empirical findings that increasing public out-
lays in education could serve as an alternative strategy to improve
health. By some calculations, investments in schooling have an even
higher rate of return on health than expenditures in medical care. 68
But that should only whet our appetites for a comprehensive behav-
ioral understanding of health outcomes. The strong and well-docu-
mented relationship between education and health suggests a role for
psychosocial factors in predicting health outcomes and can serve as an
analytical foundation for other psychosocial factors that have been
less studied. The health economics literature has made valuable pro-
gress in proposing specific mechanisms through which the causality
from education to health operates, and it is useful to harness these
mechanisms to understand the role of other behavioral variables.
A review of the literature suggests four different causal mecha-
nisms through which education improves health. 69 Two mechanisms,
allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, are captured by the E
variable in the Grossman model, and two, an exogenous third variable
and an endogenous time preference, build on the model's intertem-
poral utility function. Though these mechanisms can easily be (and
are quite likely to be) interrelated, and though they are sometimes
empirically indistinguishable, they each posit separate pathways and
are thus discussed individually. The remainder of this Part discusses
each mechanism in turn and looks to the fields of social psychology,
health psychology, and public health to further explicate how
psychosocial variables influence health.
66 See, e.g., Victor R. Fuchs, Time Preference and Health: An Exploratory Study, in Eco-
NOMIC ASPECTS OF HEALTH 93 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1982); Phillip Farrell & Victor R. Fuchs,
Schooling and Health: The Cigarette Connection, 1 J. HEALTH ECON. 217 (1982).
67 This direction of causality is supported through a creative use of instrumental vari-
ables in Adriana Lleras-Muney, The Relationship Between Education and Adult Mortality in the
United States, 72 REV. ECON. STUDS. 189, 189-92 (2005). A similar and thorough, though
less sophisticated, case for causality in the same direction is made in Michael Grossman,
The Correlation Between Health and Schooling, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
147 (Nestor E. Terleckyj ed., 1975). See also Grossman & Kaesmer, supra note 64, at 74-75
(1997) (reaching the same conclusion).
68 See Auster et al., supra note 64, at 434 (finding that the elasticity of mortality rates
with respect to education is twice that of medical expenditures and suggesting that invest-
ments in education might therefore be more cost-effective than medical care in improving
health outcomes). But seeJere R. Behrman, Conceptual and Measuremuent Issues, in THE SO-
CIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION Uere R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey eds., 1997) (suggesting
that education's causal effect on health outcomes is, by itself, insufficient to justify govern-
ment intervention).
69 See Grossman, Human Capital, supra note 47, at 395-96.
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A. The E Variable: Factors that Complement Investments in
Health
Recall that the Grossman model stipulates that an individual
gains utility from a depreciating stock of health while making periodic
investments in health, defined by I, = It(Mt;E). M, represents the vec-
tor of health inputs, all of which require the expenditure of resources
and are subject to a budget constraint, and E denotes knowledge capi-
tal that acts to increase the marginal productivity of the M, inputs.
The inclusion of E in the investment equation suggests that
psychosocial factors play a role in how individuals derive benefits from
limited health care resources, and the literature offers two mecha-
nisms, allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, that characterize
how elements of human capital translate into better health outcomes.
While both mechanisms capture a robust relationship between educa-
tion (specifically) and other psychosocial factors (more generally)
with health outcomes, each one offers different lessons regarding
health policy. Allocative efficiency pertains chiefly to behaviors that
can affect health, such as smoking, diet, exercise, healthcare-seeking
behavior, and risky activities, whereas productive efficiency applies to
factors that improve the effectiveness of medical care. Factors that
improve the former serve as preventive and preemptive health care,
whereas factors that improve the latter enhance the actual delivery of
health care. Both literatures suggest Medicaid policy recommenda-
tions.
1. Allocative Efficiency
The most intuitive pathway from higher levels of education to
better health outcomes is put forward by the allocative efficiency hy-
pothesis. This proposition suggests that more educated individuals al-
locate their resources more efficiently, and thus select more
marginally productive health inputs than less educated individuals. 70
The core of this hypothesis is driven by the acquisition and retention
70 The allocative efficiency hypothesis is often indistinguishable from the "tastes hy-
pothesis," a third mechanism in which schooling can improve health. The taste hypothesis
argues that "education changes tastes or preferences in a manner that favors health relative
to certain other commodities." Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 74.
Both the taste hypothesis and the allocative efficiency hypothesis predict that educa-
tion changes health behaviors and the selection of health inputs, so most empirical data
fails to separate the two. Only in a situation in which new knowledge concerning health
becomes available (for example, the harmful effects of chewing tobacco) will the hypothe-
ses have different predictions; in such an instance, the allocative efficiency hypothesis
predicts a more rapid behavioral response by the educated. (The stimulation of a taste for
health should not be confused with a stimulation of a taste for information, which would
include useful information about health; the latter mechanism would be totally indistin-
guishable from the process associated with the allocative efficiency hypothesis). For these
reasons, the tastes hypothesis does not receive separate treatment in this discussion.
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of information. Individuals with more years of formal education are
better informed about the health consequences of certain behaviors
and thus are in the position to allocate their time and resources to
cost-effective health inputs. 7 1
Evidence for the allocative efficiency hypothesis is robust, as
many studies indicate that higher levels of education lead individuals
to pursue healthy behaviors, such as improvements in diet 72 and regu-
lar exercise,7 3 and to avoid unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking and
alcohol consumption. 74 In addition, there is empirical support for
the proposed mechanism-that the acquisition and retention of
health information leads to improved health behaviors. In a study of
approximately 1,300 Brazilian children, for example, researchers ex-
amined the impact of a mother's schooling on her child's standard-
ized height, controlling for geography and parental height. They
found that a mother's schooling does not have a significant indepen-
dent effect beyond what is statistically explained by the amount of in-
formation that she receives, as measured by whether she reads
newspapers, watches television, and listens to the radio. 75 They con-
cluded that the avenues to collect information (and thus the amount
71 Similar studies illustrate that a mother's schooling significantly contributes to the
health of her children and infants. See Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 99-103
(surveying studies of the impact of a mother's schooling on infant health).
72 SeeJere R. Behrman & Barbara L. Wolfe, More Evidence on Nutrition Demand: Income
Seems Overrated and Women's Schooling Underemphacized, 14J. DEv. ECON. 105, 124-27 (1984);
Shirley A. Gerrior, Dietary Changes in Older Americans from 1977- 1996: Implications for Dietary
Quality, 12 FAM. ECON. & NUTRTION REV. 3 (1999); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios,
Information, Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RANDJ. EcoN. 459,
478-79 (1990); Barbara L. Wolfe & Jere R. Behrman, Is Income Overrated in Determining
Adequate Nutrition?, 31 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 525, 543-44 (1983).
73 See, e.g., Donald S. Kenkel, Health Behavior, Health Knowledge, and Schooling, 99 J.
POL. EcoN. 287, 288-89 (1991). Kenkel's findings also support an alternative mechanism,
where education has an effect on time preferences. See infra Part III.B.2.
74 See Kenkel, supra note 73, at 288-89 (finding that education reduces alcohol con-
sumption);J. Paul Leigh, Schooling and Seatbelt Use, 57 S. EcoN.J. 195, 206 (1990) (finding
that schooling increases seatbelt use); William Sander, Schooling and Quitting Smoking, 77
R~v. ECON. & STAT. 191, 192 (1995) (finding that schooling increases the probability of
quitting smoking); William Sander, Schooling and Smoking, 14 ECON. EDuc. REv. 23, 32-33
(1995) (finding that schooling reduces the probability of smoking).
75 Duncan Thomas et al., How Does Mother's Education Affect Child Height?, 26J. HUMAN
RFsoURCES 183, 208-09 (1991); see also Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information,
Advertising and Health Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 459, 472, 476
(1990) (concluding that the acquisition of relevant health information affects the con-
sumption of fiber-rich cereals, while formal education is "statistically insignificant"); Sora
Kim & Robin A. Douthitt, The Role of Dietary Information in Women's Whole Milk and Low-Fat
Milk Intakes, 28 INT'lJ. CONSUMER STUD. 245 (2004) (finding that dietary information sig-
nificantly contributes to greater consumption of low-fat milk, while education has little
statistical effect); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising Poliy:
A Study of Fat and Cholesterol Consumption in the United States, 1977-1990, BUR. OF ECoN.
STAFF R±vr., FED. TRADE COMMi. (1996) (finding that informational campaigns improve
individual diet decisions similarly across all education levels). But cf. Qingbin Wang et al.,
Impact of Cholesterol Information on U.S. Egg Consumption: Evidence from Consumer Survey Data, 3
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of information received), not an embedded skill or quality acquired
from the education process, are responsible for health
improvements. 76
There is significant skepticism, however, over whether the acqui-
sition of information deserves credit for generating certain health im-
provements. Donald Kenkel, representing that skeptical viewpoint,
would argue that the likelihood that a Brazilian woman acquires infor-
mation through those media is endogenous, and thus is a function,
not just a source, of her formal education. 77 Kenkel examined data
from the 1985 National Health Interview Survey and used direct mea-
sures of health knowledge 78 to estimate the effect of that knowledge
on smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, and exercise. Control-
ling for demographic variables, he found that increases in formal edu-
cation correlated with lower smoking rates, reduced heavy drinking,
and increased exercise.79 He then separated the effect of formal edu-
cation from that of specific health information and found that con-
trolling for formal education, an increase in an individual's
knowledge of the benefits and harm of a certain behavior leads to a
statistically significant improvement in that behavior.8 0 This result
comports with the findings from the Brazilian health study, that
health information has a statistically significant impact on health even
controlling for formal education. 81
Kenkel's most dramatic finding, however, was that even when
controlling for health information, formal schooling has an indepen-
dent and significantly positive effect on health. Moreover, when he
compared the relative contributions of information versus formal
schooling, the specific-knowledge coefficients were consistently
smaller than those for formal schooling.8 2 In fact, including the
health knowledge variables in the overall regression reduced the size
APPLIED ECON. LETrERS 189 (1996) (finding that both formal education and cholesterol
dietary information significantly affects egg consumption).
76 Thomas et al., supra note 75, at 208-09. Social psychologists argue that the dissemi-
nation of valuable information is one reason social support networks have proven to con-
tribute to better health outcomes. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
77 See Kenkel, supra note 73, at 299-300 (measuring the independent impacts of both
specific health knowledge and formal schooling on health behaviors).
78 Id. at 288, 291. Kenkel measures health knowledge through three health behav-
iors. Id. at 291. Cigarette knowledge is measured by the number of correct responses to
whether smoking causes each of seven illnesses. Id. Drinking knowledge is measured by
the number of correct responses to whether heavy drinking causes each of three illnesses.
Id. Exercise knowledge is given by responses correctly identifying the amount of exercise
required to change one's heart rate and breathing. Id.
79 Id. at 302-03.
80 Id.; Kenkel, supra note 73, at 302-03.
81 Thomas et al., supra note 75, at 208-09.
82 Kenkel, supra note 73, at 297.
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of the schooling coefficient by only 5-20%.83 Thus, while specific
health information does lead to certain improvements in health be-
havior, formal schooling plays a broader role in influencing health
outcomes.8 4 The mechanism that converts schooling into improved
health involves more than a simple dissemination of useful
information.8 5
The interesting feature in the debate over the allocative efficiency
hypothesis is its effort to render more precise the popular metric
"years of formal education," and thus to articulate a specific mecha-
nism for how education improves health. 6 While this debate is fruit-
ful, and while researchers have usefully examined the impact of both
formal education and of specific pieces of and pathways for informa-
tion,8 7 scholars have not fully confronted the more elemental prob-
lem that the allocative efficiency hypothesis suffers from the restrictive
assumptions of orthodox economics. It rests on the broad assumption
that individuals optimize an objective function subject to a budget
constraint and incomplete information, and as an individual becomes
better informed, she will re-optimize her objective function subject to
83 Id.
84 See id. at 297, 302-03.
85 There is a similar debate over whether education improves health by facilitating
the retention and absorption of valuable health information. A study of fiber consumption
following the 1979 U.S. Surgeon General's recommendation to eat fiber to reduce the
threat of colon cancer and the subsequent 1984 advertising campaign by the Kellogg Com-
pany and the National Cancer Institute found that years of formal schooling had a signifi-
cant positive effect on fiber intake from cereal, whereas household income had virtually no
effect. See Ippolito & Mathios, supra note 72, at 475-78. The study concluded that educa-
tion improves individuals' capacities to absorb and retain accurate health information,
which then led to improved health behaviors. Id. Data from the 1990 National Health
Interview Survey, which showed that "the inure educated were more likely to have heard
AIDS called HIV and were more likely to have heard of radon," also supports this conclu-
sion. See Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 83-84.
Explaining the behavior of smokers is slightly more difficult. As Grossman and Kaest-
ner write:
In response to the first Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health
in 1964, smoking participation rates of more educated consumers declined
rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In this period, educated consum-
ers were more likely to quit smoking and less likely to begin than less-edu-
cated consumers were. These data imply differential ability to process new
information as a function of education and possibly some government ac-
tion. But it is still true today after 30 years of providing information that
the more educated are less likely to smoke than the less educated are, de-
spite the massive antismoking campaigns mounted by federal and state
governments.
Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 106. However, another study found that both
smokers and nonsmokers, due in part to the government's anti-smoking campaign, overes-
timate, rather than underestimate, the risks of smoking. See W. KiP VIscusI, SMOKING: MAK-
ING THE RiskV DECISION 83 (1992). This suggests that educated individuals are not
synthesizing health information accurately when they decide to avoid smoking.
86 See, e.g., Kenkel, supra note 73, at 288-89.
87 See id; see also supra note 75.
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the new constraints. As the above discussion illustrates, however, this
approach has significant difficulty explaining recurring unhealthy be-
haviors such as smoking and heavy drinking, suggesting that it may
not accurately reflect human behavior.8 8 The efforts to advance a
more precise understanding of the role of information are laudable,
but they need to operate within more realistic depictions of human
behavior.
This traditional economic approach could benefit from incorpo-
rating social psychological theory that attempts to model the decision-
making process underlying health behaviors. One useful theory is the
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA),89 which posits that an individual's
self-reported intention to perform a certain behavior, which intuitively
predicts her actual behavior, is a function of a weighted average of her
attitude towards that behavior and the attitudes and subjective norms
of her social group. 90 It is the model's inclusion of subjective social
norms that marks its departure from the orthodox model. An individ-
ual's personal attitude toward a behavior reflects "beliefs concerning
the probability of specific consequences following the behavior and
favorable or unfavorable evaluation of those consequences,"9 1 and this
captures the individual's health information, knowledge, and any
other considerations that are relevant to individualized optimizing be-
havior. But the TRA's inclusion of subjective social norms emphasizes
that environmental, and perhaps irrational, factors also play impor-
tant roles in shaping health behavior.92
In addition to providing a more sophisticated account of individ-
ual health behaviors, the TRA also helps explain the relationship be-
tween education and health outcomes. For example, adding social
group norms to the predictive function offers a new causal pathway
for explaining how education shapes health outcomes. Since educa-
tion clearly has a role in shaping one's social circle (peer groups tend
to consist of individuals with similar educational backgrounds), educa-
tion has both a direct effect on the individual and an indirect effect
88 But see Becker & Murphy, supra note 63.
89 ICEK AJZEN & MARTIN FISHBEIN, UNDERSTANDING ATITUDES AND PREDICTING SOcLJ-
BEHAVIOR 5-9 (1980).
90 Id. The model is depicted formally by:
B - BI = wI*AB + w2*SNB
where B is overt behavior, BI is behavioral intention, Al is the attitude toward performing
the behavior, SNB is the subjective norms regarding the behavior, and w, and w2 are the
empirically determined weights reflecting the relative importance of the personal and sub-
jective attitudes. See also NolaJ. Pender & Albert R. Pender, Attitudes, Subjective Norms, and
Intentions to Engage in Health Behaviors, 35 NURSING RES. 15, 18 (1986) (concluding that
"social support expressed verbally or through family or group fitness activities may be con-
ducive to continued, regular attempts to sustain exercise adherence than unsupported in-
dividual attempts").
91 Pender & Pender, supra note 90, at 15.
92 See AJzEN & FISHBEIN, supra note 89, at 57-58.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
through the individual's peer group. One interesting illustration
arises from a study by Grossman in 1975, which was one of the first
large-scale empirical studies demonstrating the causality of formal
schooling on health. 93 Using instrumental variables, Grossman found
that the formal schooling of one's spouse captures nearly as much of
the variance of the individual's health that the individual's own
schooling explains. 94 This is consistent with the underlying notion of
the TRA-that close peers and romantic partners will shape health
behaviors.9 5
If health behaviors were primarily shaped by information, as the
literal version of the allocative efficiency hypothesis suggests, then the
obvious policy response would be to initiate vast public information
campaigns and educational programs that familiarize individuals with
the health consequences of their behaviors. 9 6 Such an approach is
not without value, as evidenced by the success of several health educa-
tion campaigns. 97 The allocative efficiency approach fails, however, to
account for the persistent unhealthy behavior of those individuals
who cannot claim they lack information about the harmful effects of
their actions.98 For predicting unhealthy behaviors that continue de-
spite targeted public campaigns, the TRA has proven to be more accu-
rate. Researchers, for example, have used the TRA to predict family
93 See Grossman, supra note 67.
94 Id. at 180-81, 203-05.
95 See AjZEN & FISHBEIN, supra note 89, at 57.
96 A slight variation of the allocative efficiency hypothesis argues that education im-
proves health by enhancing the ability to retain and process information, rather than the
ability simply to acquire it. Unfortunately, this alternative mechanism is empirically indis-
tinguishable from the standard hypothesis and reveals a real difficulty with the allocative
efficiency hypothesis. Because the hypothesis does not distinguish between whether educa-
tion acts directly by providing individuals with health information or indirectly by increas-
ing individual retention capacity, the hypothesis's value remains limited. Nonetheless,
even according to the alternative version, public information campaigns would be a logical
policy response, though the campaign may need simplification and repetition to accom-
modate varying retention capacities,
97 See, e.g., Ippolito & Mathios, supra note 72, at 459 (analyzing a successful nutrition
campaign); Daniel P. Moynihan, Epidemic on the Highways, THE REPORTER, Apr. 30, 1959, at
16 (initiating the movement for changes to automobile safety mechanisms, including the
addition of seatbelts); infra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing information cam-
paigns targeting Hispanic comunities). But see Malcolm Gladwell, Wrong Turn: How the
Fight to Make America's Highways Safer Went Offcourse, NEW YORKER, June 11, 2001, at 50 (dis-
cussing seatbelt campaigns' mixed success in reducing crash-related injuries). Anti-smok-
ing campaigns have also enjoyed success. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
897 (2004) (touting the "tremendous progress" of anti-smoking campaigns since the first
Surgeon General's report on smoking in 1964), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/
sgr/sgr_2004/chapters.htm.
98 See, e.g., Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 106 (noting the continued failure
of informed individuals to quit smoking); cf Viscusi, supra note 85; Becker & Murphy,
supra note 63, at 694-95.
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planning decisions,99 condom use, 110 weight loss action,"" and atti-
tudes toward seeking professional psychological care. 1 2
Unfortunately, TRA-explained problems do not lend themselves
to easy policy solutions. The TRA implies that standard health educa-
tion programs would find limited success in changing health behav-
iors because shaping an individual's personal attitudes toward or
knowledge of health behaviors comprises only half the equation. Suc-
cessful interventions will also have to influence the social norms of an
individual's peer group, which is a much tougher challenge."," Never-
theless, some researchers suggest that group-based interventions can
influence both individual and group attitudes. Uomoto and Gorsuch,
for example, argue that mental health education programs in Japa-
nese-American communities could increase both personal awareness
and social norms in support of mental health service utilization.
1 0 4
Other strategies include campaigns that target peer pressures rather
than emphasize the dissemination of information, or perhaps cam-
paigns that use community leaders to model certain health-promoting
behaviors. 105
A separate line of scholarship in the law-and-norms literature dis-
cusses the possibility of influencing social norms to change individual
99 See, e.g., Andrew R. Davidson &JamesJ. Jaccard, Population Psychology: A New Look at
an Old Problem, 31J. PERSONALITY AND SoC. PSYCHOL. 1073, 1080-82 (1975); Fishbein et al.,
Predicting and Understanding Family Planning Behaviors: Beliefs, Attitudes and Intentions, in
AjZEN & FISHBEIN, supra note 89, at 130, 138-47; James J. Jaccard & Andrew R. Davidson,
Toward an Understanding of Family Planning Behaviors: An Initial Investigation, 2 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 228, 234 (1972).
1t0 See, e.g., Dolores Albarracin et al., Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior as
Models of Condom Use: A Meta-Analysis, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 142, 155-57 (2001).
101 See, e.g., Eleanor Buckman Saltzer, Locus of Control and the Intention to Lose Weight, 6
HEALTH EDUC. MONOGRAPHS 118, 125-26 (1978); Dorothy Sejwacz et al., Predicting and Un-
derstanding Weight Loss: Intentions, Behaviors and Outcomes, in AJZEN & FISHBEIN, supra note
89, at 101, 107-12.
102 See, e.g., Jordana K. Baker & Marilyn Y. Peay, Predicting Intentions to Seek Help from
Professional Mental Health Services, 31 AuSTL. & N.Z.J. PSYCHIATRY 504, 510-11 (1997); Rich-
ard P. Halgin et al., Relation of Depression and Help-Seeking History to Attitudes Toward Seeking
Professional Psychological Help, 34J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 177, 181-84 (1987).
103 The relative weights in the TRA model vary across different behaviors, which sug-
gests that some behaviors would be receptive to information campaigns that merely edu-
cate individuals, whereas other behaviors are more a function of social norms.
104 Jay M. Uomoto & Richard L. Gorsuch, Japanese American Response to Psychological
Disorder: Referral Patterns, Attitudes, and Subjective Norms, 12 AM. J. COMMUNC7- PS'CHOL. 537,
547-49 (1984).
105 The anti-smoking advertising campaign frequently uses peer pressure, social
norms, and celebrity endorsements to convey its message. See Exhibit, National Library of
Medicine, Anti-Smoking Campaigns, available at bttp://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visu-
alculture/antismoking.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). The assorted devices employed in
anti-smoking campaigns are part of a recent National Library of Medicine exhibit entitled
"Visual Culture and Public Health Posters." See http://ww.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visu-
alculture/vchome.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
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behavior.10 6 Both Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig, for example,
have argued that government interventions can facilitate desirable so-
cial norms to deter unhealthy or risky behaviors. 10 7 Sunstein high-
lights what he calls "the expressive function of law" where legal rules
convey value judgments about certain activities, and this moral sua-
sion influences underlying social norms.1 08 Consequently, though le-
gal sanctions may not directly inhibit undesirable behavior, they may
have an indirect effect on behavior by changing social norms. 10 9 Simi-
larly, Lessig attributes to legal rules the power to change social percep-
tions through the "ambiguation" of social norms. 110 When certain
behaviors become illegal, an individual's deviation from a peer
group's risky behavior is interpreted as an effort to comply with the
law rather than a departure from the group."t ' Thus, peer pressure to
continue engaging in the harmful and socially undesirable activity de-
creases. 112 Both of these theories suggest that legal sanctions can play
a role in Medicaid policy reform, and that reformers should consider
punishing unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking or eating fatty foods.
More generally, while these approaches both appreciate the difficulty
of changing individual behaviors that are embedded within a social
fabric of norms, they argue that government interventions can still
influence a peer group's beliefs and encourage healthy behaviors.
The menu of specific policy recommendations provided here
may be useful, but the discussion's most valuable contribution lies in
its effort to move beyond the simple policy prescription of promoting
formal education and towards more precise and tailored educational
policies.1 13 Policymakers may find public health campaigns useful,
whether those campaigns simply publicize valuable health informa-
tion or try to influence the social norms underlying unhealthy behav-
1o6 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MIcH.
L. R~v. 338 (1997).
107 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. RFV. 943, 962-72
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2029-32
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function of Law]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. Rv. 903, 953-65 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
108 See Sunstein, Expressive Function of Law, supra note 107, at 2025-26; Sunstein, Social
Norms, supra note 107, at 964-65.
109 See Sunstein, Expressive Function of Law, supra note 107, at 2032-33; Sunstein, Social
Norms, supra note 107, at 958-59.
110 See Lessig, supra note 107, at 1010.
111 Id. at 1010-12.
112 Id.
11n Recall the debate over the efficacy of promoting fornIal education as a strategy to
improve health. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. This approach is still attractive
to many researchers, as "years of formal education" remains a commonly used metric. See,
e.g., Lleras-Muney, supra note 67, at 8 (solving the endogeneity problem by adapting the
metric to reflect compulsory education laws as instrumental variables).
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ior. Under appropriate circumstances, both methods have been
shown to succeed in improving health behaviors.
1 4
2. Productive Efficiency
Productive efficiency, as Grossman's 1972 paper suggests,' 15 is the
second mechanism through which education improves health.
Whereas the allocative efficiency hypothesis pertains to the selection
of health inputs, the productive efficiency hypothesis pertains to the
marginal productivity of given health inputs.11 6 The productive effi-
ciency hypothesis suggests that higher levels of education lead individ-
uals to make better use-i.e., enjoy a higher marginal productivity-
of a given health input.1 1 7 Consequently, an educated individual will
produce more health stock from health care or medical care, such as
a doctor's visit or a medical procedure, than a comparable individual
with less education.1 18
From a strictly econometric perspective, it is difficult to measure
the marginal productivity of specific inputs because doing so requires
controlling for all other inputs and, consequently, the productive effi-
ciency hypothesis has little empirical support. The proposition that
certain psychosocial variables lead to more efficient uses of health
care resources does, however, find support in psychological studies.
Surveying those psychosocial variables can elucidate why psychosocial
factors, including education, can increase the efficiency of health
production.
a. Trust and Accepting Authority
The doctor-patient relationship has long been founded on trust
and authority. The patient entrusts the doctor to make medical deci-
sions in the patient's best interest and submits to the doctor's author-
ity in following the prescribed treatment. The centrality of trust and
authority, accompanied by the social norm that places the highest eth-
ical duties upon the doctor, are not mere cultural anomalies. As Ken-
neth Arrow's seminal 1963 article illustrates, the social norms of trust
and authority arise to resolve market failures that would otherwise
make the free market unable to organize efficient transactions in
health care.'1 9 Such market failures result from the complexity of
medical information, the immeasurability of health care quality, and
the patient's uncertainty and inability to make informed health care
114 See supra notes 97, 104-05 and accompanying text.
115 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 223-24, 247.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941, 965-66 (1963).
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decisions. °2 0 Without a strong social norm of patient trust, and the
corresponding ethical duties placed upon the doctor, the market for
health care would collapse under uncertainty.1 21
However, even though the market depends on trust and accept-
ance of authority, individuals vary significantly in the degree to which
they trust health care providers, and empirical studies have shown that
less-trusting patients exhibit poorer health behaviors and are less
likely to seek necessary care. Patients who trust providers are more
likely to adhere to prescribed regimens, 22 enroll in innovative cancer
treatments, 123 and engage in healthy behaviors such as exercise, smok-
ing cessation, and safe sexual practices. 124 These results comport with
other studies that measure patients' perceptions of health care provid-
ers' authority. One study found that individuals who viewed physi-
cians as authority figures and expected them to assume authority in
their role as health care providers exhibited greater health care utili-
zation. 125 A similar study found that skepticism towards health care
providers was associated with less healthy behavior, less health care
utilization, and lower compliance rates in preventive health care regi-
mens. 126 These findings are particularly unsettling because patient
skepticism is also associated with low income, less education, and a
lack of insuranceI 27-the very individuals who are most in need of
preventative health care.' 2 8
120 See id. at 951-52.
121 See id. at 965-66.
122 David H. Thorn et al., Further Validation and Reliability Testing of the Trust in Physician
Scale, 37 MEDICAL CARE 510 (1999).
123 Doris T. Penman et al., Informed Consent for Investigational Chemotherapy: Patients' and
Physicians' Perceptions, 2 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 849 (1984).
124 Dana G. Safran et al., Linking Primary Care Performance to Outcomes of Care, 47J. FAM-
iLY PRAc. 213, 214-18 (1998). See generally Mark A. Hall, Law Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 463, 478-82 (providing an overview of the therapudic value of patient trust); David
H. Thom et al., Measuring Patients' Trust in Physicians When Assessing Quality of Care, 23:4
HEALTH APF. 124 (emphasizing the clinical importance of understanding patients' trust in
physicians and urging further empirical research).
t25 Peter H. Ditto et al., Beliefs About Physicians: Their Role in Health Care Utilization,
Satisfaction, and Compliance, 17 B.Aslc & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 23, 42 (1995).
126 Kevin Fiscella et al., Skepticism Toward Medical Care and Health Care Utilization, 36
MED. CARE 180, 183 (1998).
127 Id. at 183-84.
128 SeeJohn Z. Ayanian et al., Unmet Health Needs of Uninsured Adults in the United States,
284 JAIMA 2061, 2061, 2065 (2000) (finding that the uninsured develop various medical
conditions at higher rates than those covered by health insurance and that uninsured
adults are significantly more likely to have their needs for preventative medical care un-
met); Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Reverse Targeting of Treventive Care Due
to Lack of Health Insurance, 259 JAMA 2872, 2874 (1988) (finding the lack of health insur-
ance to be the "strongest and most consistent predictor" for a failure to receive needed
screening tests, placing the poor and uninsured at particularly high risk for various medi-
cal conditions).
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Related studies find that race plays a significant role in shaping
individuals' trust of health care providers. A 1999 Kaiser Family Foun-
dation study, for example, found that views on whether the health
care system "treats people equally" differed strikingly by race.1 29
About two-thirds of African Americans and over half of Latinos be-
lieved they received lower-quality health care than whites; in contrast,
the majority of whites believed care was delivered equitably. '3 0 Unfor-
tunately, many of these feelings of distrust and discrimination by ra-
cial minorities are well-founded. A recent congressionally authorized
report by the Institute of Medicine found that, even when controlling
for income and insurance coverage, racial and ethnic minorities in
fact received lower-quality care than whitesY3' Moreover, some stud-
ies suggest that the disparity in treatment stems directly from differ-
ences in physicians' perceptions of patients.' 3 2 One study found that
a patient's race affected physicians' perceptions of a patient's intelli-
gence, beliefs about a patient's likelihood of engaging in risky behav-
ior and adhering to medical advice, and feelings of affiliation towards
patients. 133 Physicians' prejudices, whether well-meaning or reflecting
outright racism, seem to validate African Americans' feelings of dis-
trust towards the health care system.13 4
129 Marsha Lillie-Blanton et al., Race, Ethnicity, and the Health Care System: Public Percep-
tions and Expereinces, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 218, 227 (2000).
130 Id.
131 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 1-2 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2002), available at http://
ww.nap.edu/openbook/030908265X/html/index.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2004). In
announcing the study, the Institute of Medicine noted:
[M]inorities are less likely to be given appropriate cardiac medications or
to undergo bypass surgery, and are less likely to receive kidney dialysis or
transplants, In addition, several studies show significant racial differences
in who receives appropriate cancer diagnostic tests and treatments. Minori-
ties also are less likely to receive the most sophisticated treatments for HIV
infection, which could forestall the onset of AIDS. By contrast, they are
more likely to receive certain less-desirable procedures, such as lower limb
amputations for diabetes and other conditions.
Press Release, Institute of Medicine, Minorities More Likely to Receive Lower-Quality
Health Care, Regardless of Income and Insurance Coverage (Mar. 20, 2002), available at
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/030908265X?OpenDocument (last
visited Dec. 21, 2004).
1-32 INSIIUITE OF MEDICINE, supra note 131, at 162-74; Michael S. O'Malley et al., The
Association of Race/Ethnicity. Socioeconomic Status, and Physician Recommendation for Mam-
mography: Who Gets the Message About Breast Cancer Screening?, 91 Au. J. PuB. HEALTH 49,
52-53 (2001) (noting that physicians' perceptions regarding patient minority status and
socioeconomic status may be responsible for difference in mammography recommenda-
tions among racial groups).
133 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 131, at 166.
1-14 See id. at 166-67. Note that physicians' prejudicial attitudes towards racial minori-
ties both directly affect minority health, because these attitudes cause physicians to provide
minorities with inadequate medical attention, and indirectly affect minority health, by in-
terfering with the ability to develop trust-based relations.
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Regardless of whether perceptions of prejudice are responses to
actual discrimination, minorities' attitudes regarding the health care
establishment are consistent with the unfortunate observation that
they fail to seek adequate health care, even when controlling for ac-
cess and income. Studies have found African Americans were less
likely to complete prescribed medical regimens following hospital dis-
charges, 35 comply with well childcare guidelines, 36 and utilize availa-
ble prenatal care. 13 7 Notably, African Americans are less likely to seek
care, including vitally important procedures such as periodic examina-
tions for breast cancer, even when they enjoy economic and logistical
access to health care equal to that of whites. 138
If, in fact, distrust leads to sub-optimal health care utilization,
then trust is a positive complement to health care. That is, a trusting
individual is more likely to seek available care and follow prescribed
regimens than a distrusting patient, thereby increasing the efficacy of
health care access. Accordingly, efforts should focus on increasing pa-
tient trust. The Institute of Medicine has proposed initiating cultur-
ally appropriate patient education programs, including disseminating
CD-ROMs, publishing pamphlets, and conducting in-person consulta-
tion, to encourage patients to access appropriate care and participate
in treatment decisions. 139 These recommendations appear to be low-
cost and potentially effective policy interventions. However, because
so much African-American distrust is unfortunately validated, inter-
ventions should also target doctors. Race sensitivity training or other
counseling programs may alert a physician to her inadvertent race-
based presumptions and prejudices. 140 In addition, increasing the
1 35 See David A. Ganz et al., Adherence to Guidelines for Oral Anticoagulation After Venous
Thrombosis and Pulmonary Embolism, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 776, 778-79 (2000) (finding
that African Americans were less likely than the average patient to continue therapy for an
adequate time period after diagnosis with deep venous thrombosis or a pulmonary embo-
lism); Linda E. Rose et al., The Contexts of Adherence for Afican Americans with High Blood
Pressure, 32J. ADVANCED NuSINc 587, 591-92 (2000) (finding that African American males
fear physicians' judgmentalism and are more likely to return for care when physicians are
deemed to be empathetic).
136 Donna S. Ronsaville & Rosemarie B. Hakim, Well Child Care in the United States:
Racial Differences in Compliance with Guidelines, 90 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 1436, 1439 (2000)
(finding that race was a stronger predictor of noncompliance with well childcare guide-
lines than education, income, and low-quality prenatal care).
137 W. Parker Frisbie et al., Prenatal Care Utilization Among Non-Hispanic Whites, African
Americans, and Mexican Americans, 5 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 21, 27(2001) (finding
that race remained a strong predictor of low utilization of prenatal care even when control-
ling for other demographic factors, socioeconomic status, and medical risk).
138 Sandra C. Garmon Bibb, The Relationship Between Access and Stage at Diagnosis of
Breast Cancer in African American and Caucasian Women, 28 ONCOLOGY NURSING F. 711,
714-15 (2001) (finding that among female military personnel, who are all guaranteed
equal access to medical care, African Americans with breast cancer received diagnoses at
later stages then whites).
139 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 131, at 196-98.
140 See id. at 213-14 (recommending cross-cultural education for physicians).
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number of African-American and Hispanic doctors could diminish
distrust among racial minority patients. 4 1 If increasing minority rep-
resentation in the health care professions would increase minority
health care utilization, then the resulting social returns would likely
justify public subsidies for minority medical school scholarships.1 42
Lastly, some scholars have lamented the departure of African-Ameri-
can-run hospitals precisely because they reduced distrust among mi-
nority patients, 143 and perhaps sponsoring increased African-
American control over health care institutions could have similar
results.
b. Social Support
Social support, usually measured by the number and intimacy of
an individual's social relations or an individual's involvement in social
activities, has proven to be a robust contributor to good health.
Though the tradition in this area of study dates itself back to Emile
Durkheim, t44 recent examination of this relationship by social epide-
miologists blossomed following Berkman and Syme's 1979 study.
145
This nine-year longitudinal study of residents of Alameda, California
found that individuals who were more socially integrated at the outset
of the study lived longer than those with fewer social ties. 14 6 Subse-
quent prospective population studies have established correlations be-
141 See id. at 186 (calling for an increase in the proportion of underrepresented minor-
ities among health professionals); see also THE SULLIVAN COMMISSION, MISSING PERSONS: MI-
NORITIES IN THE HEALTH PROFESSIONS 3 (2004) (advocating efforts to increase racial
minority representation in the health professions as a means to reversing America's grow-
ing health disparities), available at http://admissions.duhs.duke.edu/suIlivancommission/
documents/Sullivan_Final_Report_000.pdf.
142 See THE SULLIVAN COMMISSION, supra note 141, at ch. 5 (advancing several recom-
mendations to subsidize minority representation); Position Paper, American College of
Physicians, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care (Mar. 31, 2003), reprinted in 141
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 226 (2004), available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/health-
care-disp.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2004). Both sensitivity campaigns and increasing the
number of minority doctors also have the power to influence social norms within minority
communities to make medical providers more trustworthy and accessible to African Ameri-
cans. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 131, at 186, 199-214. Thus, the TRA offers an
additional, alternative mechanism for inducing African American trust of doctors by creat-
ing more conducive social norms to induce appropriate health-seeking behavior.
143 See, e.g., Bruce Vladeck, Keynote Presentation II, in CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
PUBLIC HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, THE UNINSURED DEBATE: HEALTH INSURANCE VS.
HEALTH CARE ACcESS 10, 14-15 (2000), at http://www.caph.org/publications/
uninsured.pdf.
144 EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 373-78 (1951).
145 Lisa F. Berkman & S. Leonard Syme, Social Networks, Host Resistance, and Mortality: A
Nine-Year Follow-Up Study of Alameda County Residents, 109 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 186 (1979).
146 Id. at 200.
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tween interpersonal relationships and mortality, physical morbidity,
and recovery from chronic and other types of illnesses. 147
Researchers have established three main types of supportive so-
cial interactions: emotional, informational, and instrumental. 148
Emotional support "involves the verbal and nonverbal communication
of caring and concern" and can provide strength to individuals coping
with illness, mitigate the impact of life-related stressors, and give
meaning or purpose to the daily struggles of investing in one's
health. 149 Such emotional support can improve health through a
number of different pathways. First, a "stress-buffering model" sug-
gests that emotional support mitigates the stressors shown to increase
the incidences of certain illnesses, including physiologic or maladap-
tive behavioral responses to stressful events. 150 Emotional support
147 See, e.g., Dan G. Blazer, Social Support and Mortality in an Elderly Community Popula-
tion, 115 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 684, 691-92 (1982) (duplicating Berkman and Syme's find-
ings of an association between longevity and perceived support, social networks, and social
interaction); Sheldon Cohen et al., Social Ties and Susceptibility to the Common Cold, 277
JAMA 1940, 1942 (1997) (observing that "the rate of colds [among persons exposed to a
common cold virus in an experiment] decreased with increased social network diversity");
George A. Kaplan et al., Social Connections and Mortality from All Causes and from Cardiovascu-
lar Disease: Prospective Evidence from Eastern Finland, 128 AM.J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 370, 377 (1988)
(finding that "reduced social connections are related to mortality from cardiovascular dis-
ease"); Thomas M. Vogt et al., Social Networks as Predictors of Ischemic Heart Disease, Cancer,
Stroke, and Hypertension: Incidence, Survival and Mortality, 45 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 659,
662-64 (1992) (observing that social networks increased an individual's likelihood of sur-
viving ischemic heart disease, cancer, and stroke). For surveys of studies establishing the
more general relationship between social relations and health, see Lisa F. Berkman et al.,
Gender Differences in Cardiovascular Morbidity and Mortality: The Contribution of Social Networks
and Support, 15 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 112 (1993); W. Eugene Broadhead et al., The Epidemio-
logic Evidence for a Relationship Between Social Support and Health, 117 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 521
(1983); Sheldon Cohen & Thomas Ashby Wills, Stress, Social Support, and the Buffering Hy-
pothesis, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 310 (1985); James S. House et al., Social Relationships and Health,
241 Sci. 540 (1988); Alan Reifman, Social Relationships, Recovery from Illness, and Survival: A
Literature Review, 17 ANNALS BE-AV. MED. 124 (1995).
148 See Sheldon Cohen et al., Social Relationships and Health, in SOCIAL SUPPORT MEA-
SUREMENT AND INTERVENTION: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 3, 4 (Sheldon
Cohen et al. eds., 2000); James S. House & Robert L. Kahn, Measures and Concepts of Social
Support, in SOCIAL SUPPORT AND HEALTH 83, 102-03 (Sheldon Cohen & S. Leonard Syme
eds., 1985); Peggy A. Thoits, Social Support and Psychological Well-Being: Theoretical Possibilities,
in SOCIAL SUPPORT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATIONS 51, 53 (Irwin G. Sarason & Bar-
bara R. Sarason eds., 1985).
149 Vicki S. Helgeson & Sheldon Cohen, Social Support and Adjustment to Cancer: Recon-
ciling Descriptive, Correlational, and Intervention Research, 15 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 135, 135
(1996); see also Thoits, supra note 148, at 53 (describing emotional support as "assertions or
demonstrations of love, caring, esteem, value, empathy, sympathy, and/or group-
belonging.").
150 See Sheldon Cohen & Garth McKay, Social Support, Stress, and the Buffering Hypothesis:
A Theoretical Analysis, in 4 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND HEALTH 253, 253 (Andrew Baum
et al. eds., 1984). A common use of the stress-buffering model is to evaluate the role of
social support for cancer victims. See, e.g., Alice B. Kornblith et al., Social Support as a Buffer
to the Psychological Impact of Stressful Life Events in Women with Breast Cancer, 91 CANCER 443,
450 (2001).
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from social relations can also assure individuals that they can get assis-
tance from others to cope with perceived demands, thereby prevent-
ing individuals from viewing a particular situation to be highly
stressful. 151 In addition, emotional support from social relations can
act more directly by promoting a variety of positive psychological
states that can enhance immune function and induce individuals to
engage in healthy behaviors and follow proscribed medical
regimens. 152
Social networks have also served as sources of valuable informa-
tion, both in assisting individuals struggling with an illness and in gen-
erally promoting healthy behaviors.1 53 Informational support can also
influence health outcomes "by providing patients with ways of manag-
ing their illness and coping with symptoms. ' 15 4 It "may enhance pa-
tients' optimism about the future and thus reduce feelings of future
vulnerability." 155 Thus, informational support can operate through
many of the same pathways as emotional support.
Lastly, social networks also provide supportive social interaction
via instrumental support. Instrumental support "involves the provi-
sion of material goods, for example, transportation, money, or assis-
tance with household chores" and can contribute significantly to an
individual's ability to cope with the stresses and burdens of an
illness. 156
The lesson from these studies is that social networks, through a
variety of proffered mechanisms, improve health outcomes and, par-
ticularly for individuals struggling with a chronic illness, improve the
effectiveness of medical care. These effects should be sufficient to
convince health care providers to develop interventions and treat-
ments that provide social support. Moreover, empirical studies con-
firm the success of some of these interventions, particularly for cancer
patients. A team of researchers at UCLA, for example, examined the
effect of six weekly ninety-minute group counseling and information
151 See Cohen et al., supra note 148, at 10-11.
152 See Sheldon Cohen & S. Leonard Syme, Issues in the Study and Application of Social
Support, in SOCIAL SUPPORT AND HEALTH, supra note 148, at 6-7; Thomas Ashby Wills, Sup-
portive Functions of Interpersonal Relationships, in SOCIAL SUPPORT AND HEALTH, supra note
148, at 61, 67-68. Another way to characterize the effect of emotional support is that it
reduces an individual's discount rate; thus, the individual ascribes greater value to future
utility and invests more in future health by seeking preventative care. See infra Part III.B.2
(discussing within the intertemporal utility function the implications of an endogenous
discount rate). It is not difficult to imagine why an individual's emotional support would
lead to a greater valuation of the future.
153 The utility of acquiring information to promote health, whether from social net-
works or from formal education, supports one version of the allocative efficiency hypothe-
sis. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
154 Helgeson & Cohen, supra note 149, at 135-36.
155 Id. at 136.
156 Id.
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sessions for malignant melanoma patients. 157 Six months after the
group intervention ended, patients who attended the sessions exhib-
ited reduced psychological distress and improved immune system
functioning than a control group,158 and six years later the same pa-
tients exhibited decreased recurrence and lower mortality rates.' 59
Similarly, David Spiegel studied the impact of weekly ninety-minute
group discussions on metastatic breast cancer patients. 160 His team of
researchers found that by the end of the year, participants of the
weekly sessions reported less depression, greater vigor, and less fatigue
than a control group, 161 and ten years later the program had in-
creased participants' survival, on average, by 19 months.1 62
The success of these interventions contains lessons for Medicaid
policymakers. One easy policy strategy would be to fund the creation
of social support groups or group counseling. A more tailored ap-
proach would be to develop interventions that fulfill the specific roles
provided by informational or instrumental supports. Thus, email list-
serves or chat groups, which might not provide individuals with real
emotional support, could facilitate the delivery of desired health-re-
lated information. Similarly, policymakers may find that providing re-
cipients with periodic car service, prepared meals, or even access to
low-skilled handymen may prove more cost effective than providing
coverage for certain medical procedures. Though providing logistical
services is unlikely to offer sufferers of chronic illnesses the adequate
human contact that many lack, it would provide assurance that daily
chores, such as preparing meals, running errands, or travel to the doc-
tor's office, will not be a burden. These services could reduce the
daily toil of chronic illnesses and provide valuable, health-enhancing
instrumental support.
More challenging would be an effort to encourage, more broadly,
the creation of social networks. Robert Putnam, for example, has
cited the relative lack of social networks in the United States as a cause
for inadequate investment in human capital and certain failures of
157 Fawzy I. Fawzy et a]., A Structured Psychiatric Intervention for Cancer Patients: L Changes
Over Time in Methods of Coping and Affective Disturbance, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 720,
721 (1990).
158 Fawzy I. Fawzy et al., A Structured Psychiatric Intervention for Cancer Patients: II. Changes
Over Time in Immunological Measures, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 729, 733 (1990).
159 Fawzy I. Fawzy, Malignant Melanoma: Effects of an Early Structured Psychiatric Interven-
tion, Coping, and Affective State on Recurrence and Survival 6 Years Later, 50 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSvCHIATRY 681, 688 (1993).
160 David Spiegel et al., Group Support for Patients with Metastatic Cancer A Randomized
Prospective Outcome Study, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 527, 528-29 (1981).
161 Id. at 530.
162 David Spiegel et al., Effect of Psychosocial Treatment on Survival of Patients with Meta-
static Breast Cancer, 2 LANCET 888, 889 tbl. III (1989).
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democratic politics.1 63 Perhaps concerted efforts toward developing
local community associations or neighborhood groups would not only
improve health outcomes, but would also deliver other economic and
social benefits. This is probably beyond the scope of Medicaid policy
(and an unlikely area for government success 16 4 ), but modest efforts
to extend social networks to certain populations could prove to be
useful.
c. Control
Some studies observe that an individual's control, or even "per-
ceived control," over elements of daily life can explain variation in
health outcomes.' 65 For example, psychologist Shelly Taylor mea-
sured differences in the degree to which women with breast cancer
believed they could control whether their cancers would come out of
remission, and she found that women who believed their cancers were
controllable exhibited a greater ability to adjust to the psychological
and physiological toils of breast cancer. 16 6 Perceived control gener-
ates even stronger results in the elderly. Ellen Langer and Judith Ro-
din conducted an experiment in which a nursing home director
delegated certain responsibilities, including scheduling movies and
tending to plants, to one group of elderly residents but not to the
other.167 The group with greater control became happier, more ac-
163 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNrIY (2000).
164 See ALEXIS DF TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68 (1835)
In some countries a power exists which, though it is in a degree foreign to
the social body, directs it, and forces it to pursue a certain track. In others
the ruling force is divided, being partly within and partly without the ranks
of the people. But nothing of the kind is to be seen in the United States;
there society governs itself for itself.
). Tocqueville, for one, would be skeptical of the prospects of government-created com-
munities in the United States.
165 As the studies in this Section illustrate, the distinction between control and per-
ceived control is nebulous, so no effort is made here to distinguish the two. One impor-
tant note is that while perceived control is often the central focus for psychologists,
perhaps because it is easier to measure through self-assessment, it does not imply the ab-
sence of actual control. See Suzanne Thompson et al., Illusions of Control, Underestimates, and
Accuracy: A Control Heuristic Explanation, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 143 (1998). For policymaking
purposes, moreover, delegating actual control is a good mechanism to increase an individ-
ual's perceived control over certain elements of their life. See Barbara A. Israel et al., Health
Education and Community Empowerment: Conceptualizing and Measuring Perceptions of Individ-
ual, Organizational, and Community Control, 21 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 149, 149-66 (1994).
166 Shelley E. Taylor et al., Attributions, Beliefs About Control, and Adjustment to Breast
Cancer, 46J. PERSONALrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 498-99 (1984).
167 EllenJ. Langer &Judith Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibil-
ity for the Aged: A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 191, 193-94 (1976).
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tive, 168 and exhibited a lower mortality rate eighteen months later)t 69
Richard Shultz similarly observed that permitting elderly nursing
home residents to decide the frequency and duration of visits from
college students led to greater activity and fewer medications con-
sumed, as compared to a control group. 70 Other studies have illus-
trated that perceived control over both routine schedules and stressful
events is associated with better adjustment to chronic illnesses, greater
immunity to disease, increased happiness, and, among residents of
nursing homes, improved health and adjustment to the nursing home
environment.'71
Control fits well into the Grossman model, as education could be
interpreted as a proxy for the degree of control an individual has over
her job, career, and daily schedule. Such forms of control are very
closely associated with socioeconomic status, and thus variance in con-
trol might explain the correlation between socioeconomic status and
health. 7 2 Notably, the patients received the same health care in all of
the above experiments. Because control may complement health care
and improve the effectiveness of assorted treatments, policymakers
should aim to furnish patients with control over their treatments,
schedules, and other Medicaid services.
These principles also apply to policy decisions regarding Medi-
caid's drug coverage for chronic conditions, such as HIV. Currently,
states vary in the scope and duration of their drug coverage for HIV-
infected individuals,1 73 and most state Medicaid programs pay for
168 Id. at 197.
169 Judith Rodin & Ellen J. Langer, Long-Term Effects of a Control-Relevant Intervention
with the institutional Aged, 35 J.PERSONALITY & Soc. PSVCHOL. 897, 899-900 (1977).
170 Richard Schulz, Effects of Control and Predictability on the Physical and Psychological Well-
Being of the Institutionalized Aged, 33J, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 563, 569-71 (1976). A
follow-up study to the Schulz experiment revealed some interesting, but sad, results. See
Richard Schulz & Barbara Hartman Hanusa, Long-Term Effects of Control and Predictability-
Enhancing Intementions: Findings and Ethical Issues, 36J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1194,
1195-98 (1978). The college students stopped visiting after the study concluded, and
many months later Schulz returned to the nursing home to observe that the individuals
who had control over the visits-and then lost that control when the visits ceased-suf-
fered from a higher mortality rate than the control group. Id. at 1198.
171 SeeJudith Rodin, Aging and Health: Effects of the Sense of Control, 233 Sci. 1271, 1273
(1986) (concluding from several nursing home studies that "increased opportunities for
control and a greater sense of personal efficacy can have a positive effect on the physical
and psychological status of the institutionalized aged"); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D.
Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 193, 197-98 (1988); Sue A. Wiedenfield et al., Impact of Perceived Self-Efficacy in Coping
with Stressors on Components of the Immune System, 59 J. PEIRSONIATY & Soc. PSvCHOL. 1082,
1089-93 (1990) (finding that patients' perceptions of control over stressors corrolated with
immunological and physiological benefits).
172 See Marmot et al., supra note 42.
173 See Tim WESTMORELAND, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FOUNDATION, MEDICAID & HIV/AIDS
POLICY: A BAsic PRIMER 39-42 (1999), available at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/
13316_l.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2004).
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medications only after the Medicaid beneficiary begins exhibiting
symptoms of HIV infection. 74 While at least one study indicates that
Medicaid dollars would be better spent if they targeted earlier inter-
vention, 175 the argument for early and comprehensive drug therapy is
strengthened when considering control as a complement to medical
care. A medical regimen that allows for self-administration, as op-
posed to protocols that require hospital visits, allows patients to main-
tain control over their daily schedules and their interactions with
health care providers. The experimental findings revealing the im-
portance of perceived control suggest that entrusting patients with
this sort of autonomy will increase the effectiveness of their treatment
and thereby increase the efficiency of public spending on health care.
d. Personality and Emotion
An interesting body of literature has identified certain personality
characteristics that affect health outcomes, as several studies have
found that the prevalence of certain emotions and character traits are
associated with higher morbidity rates. Many of these negative emo-
tions correlate with each other and with low socioeconomic status,
leading some to identify a "disease-prone personality."1 76
Researchers of personality and emotions have identified numer-
ous character traits that correlate with poor health. Specifically, hos-
tility, anger, anxiety, emotional suppression, depression, fatalism, and
pessimism have all been found to affect the incidences and progres-
sions of cancer, heart disease, AIDS, and several other illnesses, which
in turn have lead to increases in overall health care utilization and
costs.1 77 Moreover, Howard Friedman and his coauthors have shown
174 See id. at 15-19, 106 ("HIV infection that is not accompanied by one of the AIDS-
defining conditions is not sufficient to qualify for Medicaid."). Additional funding for re-
troviral therapy for low-income HIV-infected individuals comes from state-based AIDS
Drug Assistance Programs (ADAPs), which are funded by the Ryan White Comprehensive
AIDS Resources Emergency Act. See id. at 120; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, No TIME TO LOSE:
THE AIDS CRIusis is NOT OVER 168-70 (Monica S. Rui7 et al. eds., 2001).
175 See Bruce R. Schackman et al., Cost Effectiveness of Earlier Initiation of Antiretroviral
Therapy for Uninsured HIV-Infected Adults, 91 AM. J. Pur. HEALTH 1456, 1457-58 (2001).
176 See, e.g., Howard S. Friedman & Stephanie Booh-Kewley, The "Disease-Prone Personal-
ity": A Meta-Analytic View of the Construct, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 539, 539 (1987). Some have
constructed a more specific "cancer-prone personality." See Lydia Temoshok et al., The
Relationship of Psychosocial Factors to Prognostic Indicators in Cutaneous Malignant Melanoma, 29
J, PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 135, 141 (1985).
177 See Suzanne G. Haynes et al., The Relationship of Psychosocial Factors to Coronary Heart
Disease in the Framingham Study, 111 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 37, 54 (1980) (finding "Type A
behavior is a significant risk factor for CHD [coronary heart disease] in both men and
women under 65 years of age"); Carlos Iribarren et al., Association of Hostility with Coronary
Artery Calcification in Young Adults, 283JAMA 2546, 2546 (2000) (finding that a "high hostil-
ity level may predispose young adults to coronary artery calcification"); Laura D. Kubzan-
sky et al., Anxiety and Coronary Heart Disease: A Synthesis of Epidemiological, Psychological, and
Experimental Evidence, 20 A.NNALS BEHAV. MED. 47, 55 (1998) (suggesting anxiety may ac-
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that certain personality traits identified in children may affect longev-
ity and mortality rates.1 78
While researchers have met only preliminary success in identify-
ing specific mechanisms that link character traits with adverse health
outcomes, several alternative pathways have been proposed. One
pathway follows from the traits themselves: anxiety, hostility, anger,
and emotional suppression are believed to lead to physiological stress,
and thereby may affect blood pressure and immunological capacity. 1 79
Another less direct pathway suggests that individuals who exhibit
higher levels of fatalism, pessimism, or depression are less likely to
seek health care or follow prescribed regimens. 180 They may be less
willing to wait in lines at hospitals or doctors' offices, follow demand-
ing health care regimens that only show benefits over time, or expend
resources in nutrition or exercise that similarly only show effects over
time.""' Likewise, fatalism, pessimism, and depression are associated
with a tendency to disengage from or quit health care regimens, and
similar negative emotions can leave an individual with fewer emo-
tional resources to cope with difficult illnesses or treatments. 18 2 Stern
and Caldicott suggest a third and more basic pathway, whereby clini-
cians simply avoid treating "the angry patient" by transferring individ-
uals with certain emotional traits to colleagues rather than dealing
directly with the illnesses. I" Through all of these causal mechanisms,
negative emotions disrupt the efficacy of health care delivery and
count for some of the incidence of coronary heart disease); Edward A. Walker et al., Psychi-
atric Illness and Irritable Bowel Syndrome: A Comparison with Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 147 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1656, 1658 (1990) (finding a correlation between irritable bowel syndrome
and "a prior history of panic disorder generalized anxiety disorder, phobia, major depres-
sion, or somatization disorder"). See generally Michael F. Scheier & Michael W. Bridges,
Person Variables and Health: Personality Predispositions and Acute Psychological States as Shared
Determinants for Disease, 57 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 255 (1995) (reviewing the literature).
178 Howard S. Friedman et al., Does Childhood Personality Predict Longevity?, 65 J. PERSON-
ALrrv & SOC. PSYCHOL. 176, 181-83 (1993).
179 See, e.g., Ichiro Kawachi et al., A Prospective Study of Anger and Coronary Heart Disease:
The Normative Aging Study, 94 CIRCULATION 2090, 2093 (1996) ("The biological mechanisms
by which anger may increase the risk of [coronary heart disease] include discharge of
circulating catecholamines, increased myocardial oxygen demand, vasospasm and platelet
aggregability.").
180 See Scheier & Bridges, supra note 177, at 261-63 (noting that patients exhibiting
signs of "fatalism and pessimism" are "more likely to withdraw prematurely from the activi-
ties of life and to give up on the hope of recovering health").
181 See id.
182 See id.; see also Laura Smart Richman, et al., Positive Emotion and Health: Going Beyond
the Negative, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2005) (observing that positive emotion also
affects health outcomes) (working paper at 20, on file with author).
183 See David T. Stern & Catherine V. Caldicott, Turfing: Patients in the Balance, 14 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 243, 243 (1999). One explanation for this is that treating angry pa-
tients requires more time and resources, see John Murtagh, The Angry Patient, 20 AuSrL.
FAM. PHYSICIAN 388 (1991) (describing the special steps physicians need to take to deal
with angry patients), which, in the aggregate, translates into higher costs of care.
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could be labeled "negative complements" that reduce the marginal
productivity of health care inputs.
While the conventional view suggests that personality traits are
inherent to an individual and difficult, if not impossible, to change
through interventions, some researchers have identified and mea-
sured external causes of some of the negative emotions associated
with poor health. A study headed by Robert Williams, for example,
asked individuals to list the number of "major life events" within the
six-month period and the number of daily "hassles" and "uplifts"
within the week prior to receiving either inpatient or outpatient
care. 18 4 Two years later, the individuals with either a large number of
major life events or many daily hassles and uplifts were more likely to
be hospitalized, and the incidence of daily hassles was independently
predictive of subsequent outpatient utilization.1 15 Similar studies have
found associations between major life events and daily hassles and up-
lifts with other measures of health status and health care utilization.1
8 6
Such life-related struggles can affect health in two ways: they can ei-
ther indirectly cause poor health by contributing to the negative emo-
tions described above (which have their own adverse health
outcomes), or they can directly affect an individual's logistical ability
to cope with an illness, follow a prescribed regimen, or find resources
or time to invest in other health inputs. Through either pathway,
these causes of emotional distress, like the negative emotions them-
selves, reduce the effectiveness of health care and are therefore also
negative complements to health care.
These findings present an interesting challenge to Medicaid
policymakers because recent scholarship suggests that negative emo-
tions mediate the relationship between socioeconomic status and
healthiS 7 If policy interventions can alleviate either the causes of neg-
ative emotions or the negative emotions themselves, then such inter-
ventions could substitute for less effective health care. Identifying
cost-effective strategies for accomplishing this, however, would be elu-
sive. Some low-cost interventions include those discussed above in re-
lation to providing social support, such as support groups or
184 See Robert Williams et al., Life Events and Daily Hassles and Uplifts as Predictors of
Hospitalization and Outpatient Visitation, 34 Soc. SC. & MED. 763, 763 (1992).
185 Id. at 766.
186 Id. at 763 (summarizing similar studies); see also Scott M. Monroe, Major and Minor
Life Events as Predictors of Psychological Distress: Further Issues and Findings, 6 J. BEHAV. MED.
189 (1983);Jos W.R. Twisk et al., Positive and Negative Life Events: The Relationship with Coro-
nary Heart Disease Risk Factors in Young Adults, 49 J. PSYCHOSOMATiC REs. 35 (2000).
187 See Linda C. Gallo & Karen A. Matthews, Understanding the Association Between Socio-
economic Status and Physical Health: Do Negative Emotions Play a Role?, 129 PSvCHOL. BuLL. 10,
41 (2003) (concluding that the limited empirical evidence suggests that "the association
between SES and health is mediated-at least in part-by cognative-emotional factors").
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integrating group counseling services with medical care.""' It may be
useful to encourage health care providers to refer patients to counsel-
ing rather than pursuing additional medical care, and counseling or
training for providers may prove to be a cost-effective strategy for ad-
dressing the problem of clinicians avoiding difficult patients. All of
these policies advocate a more integrative approach to Medicaid,
wherein supplementary services that accompany the provision of
health care can address some of the difficult psychosocial concerns
that are interlinked with medical issues. The current system of limit-
ing benefits to health insurance fails to address a sizable body of psy-
chological causes that underlie poor health.
3. Summary: The Policy Implications of the E Variable
While robust evidence suggests that higher levels of education im-
prove health outcomes, 8 9 thus validating Grossman's inclusion of the
E variable in his health demand function, there nevertheless remains
significant uncertainty over the specific mechanism through which
formal schooling causes better health. 190 This section treats the corre-
lation between schooling and health as the tip of an iceberg of
psychosocial variables, and the search for explanatory behavioral fac-
tors should not stop at formal schooling. A review of the health psy-
chology literature introduces several mechanisms through which
psychosocial factors can influence health, including mechanisms that
promote healthy behaviors and thereby preempt the need for medical
care and mechanisms that enhance the effectiveness of medical care
itself. Finally, this section identifies a collection of specific variables
that have been shown to lead to improved health outcomes.
Although translating the identification of psychosocial influences
into a menu of policy prescriptions is necessarily a speculative exer-
cise, the issues discussed here do have significant implications for im-
proving Medicaid. First, despite the debate concerning the strength
of the allocative efficiency hypothesis,' 9' empirical studies suggest that
disseminating useful health information contributes to improved
health behaviors, thus information campaigns amount to an inexpen-
sive and potentially effective health policy. This effectiveness has been
shown in campaigns that promote seatbelt use and fiber consumption
and those that illuminate the dangers of smoking. 192 Even if educa-
tion improves the allocative efficiency of health inputs by improving
188 See Part III.A.2.b-c.
189 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
190 See Grossman, Human Capital, supra note 47, at 395-404.
191 See supra Part III.A.I.
192 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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the retention-as opposed to the acquisition-of information, 93 the
returns from some public health campaigns are likely to justify their
relatively low costs.
A lack of health-related information, however, is unlikely to be
responsible for several unhealthy behaviors, such as smoking and un-
safe sexual activity, 194 and policy strategies relying on simple dissemi-
nation of information will likely prove to be inadequate. For these
public health challenges, policy strategies would benefit from consult-
ing the TRA to design interventions that influence both an individ-
ual's health-related knowledge and her social group norms. 19 5 Some
public health initiatives already have identified the utility of this ap-
proach and are employing similar strategies in campaigns that target
unhealthy behaviors in certain ethnic communities.1 96 These pro-
grams move beyond mere information dissemination and instead
reach to alter the customs and social pressures that restrain improve-
ments in health behavior.1 97
A review of the health psychology literature also identifies several
psychosocial variables that can increase the productivity and effective-
ness of other health care inputs, including medical care. These, too,
pose significant policy implications for Medicaid. Studies have found
that the propensity of a patient to trust a doctor contributes to better
health outcomes.19 8 Accordingly, policymakers should consider cam-
paigns to familiarize distrusting individuals with the health care sys-
tem, paying particular attention to racial minorities who tend to
exhibit higher levels of distrust and subsequently are less likely to seek
necessary care. 19" Other studies found that African Americans' dis-
trust of white doctors is often warranted; as a result, race sensitivity
training or affirmative action within the medical profession could pro-
mote trust and convince African Americans to seek necessary and ben-
eficial care. 20 0 Social networks are also highly predictive of health
outcomes, suggesting that Medicaid policymakers should consider in-
tegrating health care delivery with counseling and other support or
community-building services.20 ' The identification of control as a
complement to medical care should lead policyrnakers to consider al-
193 See supra note 85.
194 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 104-05.
197 See id.; see alsoJose Alberto Ucles, NHTSA Launches Successful Campaign to Promote
Seat Belt Use Among Hispanics, NHTSA Now, June 14, 2001, at I (discussing a campaign
featuring community celebrities, Hispanic professionals, and public service announce-
ments to Latin music beats).
198 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See supra Part III.A.2.b.
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ternative umbrellas of insurance coverage that would preserve benefi-
ciaries' control over their treatments and daily schedules.2 0 2 Finally,
evidence indicating that negative emotions and stress cause significant
disruptions to medical regimens suggests that health care should also
be coupled with supplemental services or counseling support.20 3 In
sum, Medicaid policymnakers have an assortment of policy options for
addressing these important psychosocial factors and improving the ef-
fectiveness of the program's medical care.
B. The Intertemporal Utility Function
While the previous Section focused on the static component of
the health demand function, this Section explores the implications of
viewing health consumption from an intertemporal perspective. In
the Grossman model, an individual optimizes the sum of her present
and discounted future utility, and a decision to invest current re-
sources and time into producing health stock is a trade of current
utility for future utility. Consequently, an individual's relative valua-
tion of current versus future utility is central to her health investment
decisions. 20 4 Individuals who heavily discount future utility will opt
for less investment in health and will instead expend more current
resources on current utility-increasing consumption, whereas more fu-
ture-oriented individuals will make larger investments in health in-
puts. Significantly, individuals in this latter category will also
experience better health, so if an objective of Medicaid is to improve
health outcomes, policymakers should induce beneficiaries to be
more future-oriented. 20 5
202 See supra Part III.A.2.c.
203 See supra Part III.A.2.d.
204 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
205 While many health policy scholars are comfortable with the conclusion that un-
healthy individuals are making suboptimal investments in their health, see, e.g., Smith,
supra note 29, at 6 (noting that many Californians can afford to purchase health insurance
but decide not to), economists may argue that government intervention to improve health
isjustified only to correct for externalities and other market imperfections-and otherwise
policymakers should presume that individuals are maximizing their intertemporal utility.
See Becker & Murphy, supra note 63, at 694-95; Behrman, supra note 68, at 5, 51-58.
There are two responses to this argument. First, significant evidence exists that individuals
in poor health-particularly the poor-impose substantial social costs. For example,
smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, and inadequate exercise all impose social costs.
See WILLARD G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS 8-11 (1991). Other
bad health habits that impose social costs include a failure to obtain necessary immuniza-
tions and unsafe sexual activities. See Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 104-05 (cit-
ing Behrman, supra note 68). But see W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TiaArEOvs 58, 66-67 (1992)
(suggesting that cigarette smoking creates net social gains-not costs-since individuals
are alive only for their most productive years). Second, parents' actions substantially affect
their children's health. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 75, and accompanying text.
Even assuming that parents could completely internalize a child's utility in charting their
own actions, the problems of bounded rationality and discounting future utilities are ac-
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Recall that the multiple-period utility function, stated formally, is:
U = 7X,[r'U,(ht, Z,)] t = 0, 1, . . . ,n
where Z, is consumption of standard commodities, h, represents the
number of healthy hours in period t, and q (0< r <1) discounts future
utilities. The greater an individual's value of r7, the more she values
future utility and the more likely she will make current investments in
health stock. Thus, the value of the discount rate, Y7, is significant in
predicting an individual's health.
The empirical problem is that the discount rate, q, is unobserv-
able and, rather than denoting a concrete parameter, represents only
a conceptual framework that relates the present to the future. There-
fore, this Section formulates causal pathways, rather than identifying
specific variables embodied in i, that connect the discount rate to
health outcomes. It focuses on two possible formulations. First, that r7
is exogenous and plays a causal role in shaping health and other in-
vestment behaviors, and second, that q is endogenous and is a func-
tion of other investment decisions and behaviors.
1. Exogenous Third Variable
An exogenous discount rate suggests that an individual has a spe-
cific preference for the future-i.e., a specific value for r/---that is em-
bedded and constant within the individual's inventory of unique
tastes. Under this framework, the discount rate predicts an individ-
ual's propensity to forgo current consumption in order to invest in
health, education, skills, and other elements of human capital that
translate into greater future returns.
According to this approach, the strong correlation between
health and education is a consequence of both health and education
being functions of the discount rate. This formulation challenges the
conclusion that higher levels of education lead to better health out-
comes and instead argues that the "third variable" of time preferences
causes both. 20 6 Victor Fuchs, the chief proponent of the "third varia-
ble" hypothesis, approached the question of exogenous time prefer-
ences in two interesting studies. In the first, Fuchs developed an
independent measure for time preferences by asking telephone survey
respondents a series of questions in which they chose between a sum
of money now and a larger sum in the future. 20 7 Then, comparing
centuated where health decisions affect intergenerational health. Consequently, even if a
parent's health decisions maximize the parent's utility, they are far less likely to maximize
the household's total intertemporal utility.
206 See Fuchs, supra note 66, at 95 ("[I] ndividuals with low rates of time discount would
invest in many years of schooling and would also invest in health-enhancing activities ....
[Therefore] the observed correlation is due to both schooling and health as depending
upon time preference.").
207 Id. at 99.
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the survey data with independent measures of participants' schooling
and health, he found that the participants' time preferences weakly
predicted their schooling and that both their time preferences and
schooling predicted their health outcomes. 208
In a more conclusive study, Peter Farrell and Victor Fuchs found
additional evidence that time preferences shape, rather than are con-
sequences of, education and health outcomes. 20 9 In a longitudinal
examination of health behaviors in four small agricultural cities in
California, Farrell and Fuchs surveyed cigarette use by a cohort of 17-
year-old high school students. They then returned to the same indi-
viduals seven years later and measured their educational attainment
and cigarette consumption at age 24.210 They found that all of the
variance in the 24 year-olds' cigarette use and educational attainment
was explained by their smoking behavior when they were 17-when
all of the subjects were in the same grade and had the same amount of
formal education.2 1 Farrell and Fuchs interpreted these results to
mean that an exogenous "third variable" first caused smoking behav-
iors at age 17 and then continued to shape the individuals' educa-
tional aspirations and health behaviors from ages 17 through 24.212
While there are different possibilities for what that "third variable"
may be, their evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that time pref-
erences are fixed and remain unaffected by schooling or other influ-
ences, and that those preferences shape both schooling and health
behaviors. 2 13
There are a number of problems with the Farrell and Fuchs ap-
proach. First, the study's results concerned only a small subject group
from agricultural communities in California.2 1 4 More importantly,
the only education Farrell and Fuchs measured was years of formal
schooling. However, it is likely that additional educational and social-
izing forces, including parental and household influences (and indi-
rectly, parental schooling), had already shaped the subjects' time
preferences. By the time the subjects were 17, they may have already
developed clear preferences for both education and health even if
those preferences were functions of social influences. Lastly, the
study's approach suffers from some of the methodological challenges
that plagued some of the earlier works on the human capital model.
208 Id. at 111-13.
209 Farrell & Fuchs, supra note 66, at 229 ("[D]ifferences in time discount could ex-
plain the observed correlation between schooling and smoking. The data in this study arc
consistent with this hypothesis.").
210 Id. at 219-20.
211 Id. at 224-26.
212 Id. at 228.
213 Id. at 228-29.
214 See Grossman & Kaestner, supra note 64, at 89.
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In those studies, scholars had difficulty in controlling for unobserv-
able variables-such as ambition and ability-that shape both educa-
tional attainment and earnings. 21 5 Similar concerns should call into
question the conclusion that time preferences, as opposed to other
unobservable variables, shape health behaviors.
If the Farrell and Fuchs model for time preferences accurately
characterizes human health behavior, then it also has the unfortunate
implication that policy interventions are necessarily limited. If time
preferences are exogenous, they are unchangeable, and policy inter-
ventions will have little effect in inducing individuals to make greater
investments in health, schooling, or skills. Remaining policy options
include more coercive devices, such as taxes or regulations, that could
mitigate the degree to which those who heavily discount the future
can engage in unhealthy activities. Some intrusive examples of coer-
cive policy devices include heavily taxing (or prohibiting) cigarettes,
alcohol, or fatty foods, subsidizing exercise at the workplace, or man-
dating periodic doctors visits-perhaps as a prerequisite to driver's li-
cense renewal.2 16 These policies may successfully induce healthier
behavior, but they operate only as responses to fixed tendencies to
invest (or not) in human capital and to engage in unhealthy behav-
ior.2 17 The third variable hypothesis precludes the possibility of ad-
215 For attempts to account for ability in earnings, see, e.g., Zvi Griliches & William M.
Mason, Education, Income, and Ability, 80 J. POL. ECON. S74, S99 (1972), which controlled
for ability in finding the economic significance of schooling on income differences, and
John C. Hause, Earnings Profile: Ability and Schooling, 80J. POL. ECON. S108, S130 (1972),
which found complementarity of ability for schooling and post-school experiences in gen-
erating earnings. Note, however, that attempts to include proxies for ability in earnings
have resulted in very modest reductions in the schooling coefficient. See Hause, supra, at
S130-31.
216 Some of these proposals are more farfetched than others. Cigarette and alcohol
consumers already pay consumption taxes, and many wished-for health care reforms pro-
pose raising these taxes. See, e.g., JANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE
TAXES iO FUND HEALTH CARE REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CRS-1 (Congressional Re-
search Service No. 94-214 E, March 8, 1994). One scholar has recently suggested a "Fat
Tax." JEFF STRNAD, CONCErTUALIZING THE "FAT TAX" 97-100 (Stanford Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 286, 2004).
217 One interesting feature in the effort to improve the health behaviors of individuals
who heavily discount the future is that interventions that attempt to force healthier behav-
iors may not increase overall utility. See Becker & Murphy, supra note 63, at 694-95 (argu-
ing that unhealthy behaviors may maximize utility for some individuals). According to the
exogenous third variable model, individuals engage in unhealthy behaviors-behaviors
that generate current utility at the expense of future utilities-because they place little
value on the future. Consequently, the only justifications for interventions are that Medi-
caid's objective is to improve health, even if it does not improve overall utility; or, more
convincingly, that unhealthy behaviors impose costly externalities, so government pro-
grams are justified in trying to amend those behaviors. See MANNING ET AL., supra note 205,
at 2-8 (summarizing the external, societal costs of unhealthy behaviors by indviduals).
Mandating and prescribing behavior is more socially beneficial, and thus more defensible,
if individual time preferences are determined endogenously.
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dressing the underlying causes of those behaviors and investment
decisions.
2. Endogenous Time Preferences
Countering the third variable hypothesis is an intuitive, simple,
and extremely useful model by Gary Becker and Casey Mulligan that
allows for an endogenous determination of time preferences.2 18
Whereas in Fuchs's formulation the discount rate, r7, is fixed and var-
ies exogenously across individuals, 2 19 the Becker and Mulligan ap-
proach models a discount rate that is determined endogenously in a
relationship with other economic variables, such as wealth, prices, and
parental subsidies. 220 Accordingly, discount rates will systematically
vary across individuals in a process the authors call "a model of pa-
tience formation."22 1
A formal adaptation of the Becker-Mulligan intertemporal utility
function to the Grossman framework combines the accumulation of
patience with the consumption of, and investment in, a health stock:
U = Xt[(q(S)) tU,(h,,Zt)] t = 0, 1 ..... n
Like the model described in Part II, Zt is consumption of standard
commodities and h, represents the number of healthy hours in period
t. The innovation in this model lies in formulating r as a function of
investments in S-goods, called "future-oriented capital," that an indi-
vidual purchases in each period along with standard commodities (Z)
and health inputs (M). 22 2 Citing an intellectual tradition dating back
to Eugen von B6hm-Bawerk, 2 23 Becker and Mulligan construct the
rl(S) discount rate such that individuals have the ability to increase
their appreciation of the future and lower their discounting of future
utilities. Formally, this means 0<q(S)<l and r'(S)>O for all S>0. The
more an individual invests in S goods, the more that individual values
future utilities.
218 See Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, The Endogenous Determination of Time Prefer-
ence, 112 Q.J. ECON. 729, 733-37 (1997).
219 See supra Part 11I.B.1.
220 See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 218, at 734-36.
221 Id. at 733, 754.
222 Recall that while h, is in the utility function, h, is a function of health inputs, previ-
ous health stock, and psychosocial factors. See supra Part II. So the individual's periodic
allocation decisions concern health inputs, M, and not "enjoyable health," h,.
223 See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 218, at 731-33, 734; see also EUGEN VON BOHM-
BAWERE, THE POSrivE THEORY OF CAPITAL 237-48 (William Smart trans., 1923) (1888) (ex-
ploring the relationship between present and future economic value). For an overview of
the history of economic thought on patience and related issues pertaining to investment
behavior, see George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Eco-
nomics of Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME 3 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster
eds., 1992).
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The key to the model-the force that creates variance in discount
rates across individuals-is the individual's decisions in allocating lim-
ited resources between Z, M, and S-goods. Just as the Grossman
model suggested that an investment in Mt is a trade of current utility
for future utility, 2 24 the same can be said for an investment in S-goods.
A fascinating element of this model is the complementarity of time
preference and health.225 The sum of an individual's future utilities is
a function of the number of future periods she lives, which in turn is a
function of her health. 22 6 So, the healthier an individual, the more
future periods she expects to enjoy, and thus the greater the total sum
of her future utility. Moreover, her health itself increases her utility,
so a healthier person expects more utility, ceteris paribus, in each future
period. These expectations of greater future utility then induce her
to make greater investments in S-goods since the marginal utility of
health is increased by an investment in S; and the contra-positive is
true as well-an individual will invest less in S-goods if they have a low
expected future utility. Similarly, individuals with low discounting of
future utilities have a higher marginal utility of health, so farsighted
individuals will invest more in health and healthy individuals will in-
vest more in patience. 227
These relationships between discount rates and investment in fu-
ture utilities also suggest that farsighted individuals will pursue other
forms of self-investment, such as education. Therefore, like the Fuchs
model, the Becker and Mulligan approach also predicts a correlation
between education and health.2 28 Unlike the Fuchs model, however,
224 See supra Part II.
225 Although Becker and Mulligan, unlike Grossman, do not model utility as a joint
utility function that includes both material consumption and health flow, their model does
observe a complementarity between time preference and future utility, which in a joint
utility function would also correspond to a complementarity of time preference and
health. See Becker and Mulligan, supra note 218, at 736.
226 Becker and Mulligan explicitly discuss the more obvious correlation, also predicted
by the model and supported by an assortment of empirical studies, between patience and
wealth. Id. at 744-54.
The Becker and Mulligan model also predicts a correlation between wealth and pa-
tience. Consider the first-order condition of the objective function subject to a budget
constraint. The marginal utility of a dollar spent on current consumption will equal the
marginal utility of a dollar spent on patience, and since both the utility from consumption
and the discount rate are monotonic concave functions, individuals with greater wealth will
always, in equilibrium, spend more in S-goods and thus develop greater patience. Mathe-
matically, the Becker and Mulligan first-order condition (for a two-period utility function
that does not include utility from health) is i'(S) [L..(q(S))fif(c)]=x,=f0'(c0). The propor-
tional relationship between i'(S) and f 0'(c0) illustrates this argument. In sum, the Becker-
Mulligan model suggests that wealth, health, education, and patience will all correlate.
227 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
228 Since education increases an individual's future earning potential, the Becker and
Mulligan model explains the correlation between education and health as follows: Large
stocks of either health or education lead to increases in future (as opposed to current)
utility, so prospects of an educated or healthy life will induce investments in patience,
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Becker and Mulligan offer the possibility that interventions can in-
crease an individual's valuation of the future. A subsidy of S-goods
would cause individuals to be more patient, and since future-oriented
patience leads to healthier lives, providing S-goods could be a policy
strategy to improve health outcomes.
This suggestion begs the question central to the Becker and Mul-
ligan model: what are S-goods? In making the correlation between
education and patience more explicit, Becker and Mulligan suggest:
Schooling also determines S partly through the study of history and
other subjects, for schooling focuses students' attention on the fu-
ture. Schooling can communicate images of the situations and diffi-
culties of adult life, which are the future of childhood and
adolescence. In addition, through repeated practice at problem-
solving, schooling helps children learn the art of scenario simula-
tion. Thus, educated people should be more productive at reduc-
ing the remoteness of future pleasures.22 9
This statement is consistent with Kenkel's findings. While Kenkel ob-
served that health-related information improved health outcomes, he
discovered that formal schooling had a larger predictive effect on
health outcomes even after controlling for health knowledge. 230
The possibility that schooling itself leads to farsightedness is an
additional reason to consider investing greater public funds in educa-
tion.231 However,just as the previous Section dissected the broad um-
brella category of "education" into more precise patience-inducing
variables, it would be useful again to identify more precise
psychosocial factors, plus corresponding interventions, that lead to
less discounting of the future.
Here, however, the psychology literature does not offer as much
help. While experimental psychologists and behavioral economists
have identified some patterns in intertemporal choices that contradict
the predictions of orthodox economics, including anomalies in the
expression of individual discount rates,232 most experimental research
which in turn will increase the marginal utilities from future health and income. So, a
healthy person is motivated to be patient and thus make human capital investments that
lead to future income, and similarly a person with prospects for deferred income will invest
in patience and thus health. See Becker & Mulligan, supra note 218, at 743-44.
229 Id. at 735-36.
230 See Kenkel, supra note 73, at 302-03 ("In fact, in most cases the highly educated
group chooses healthier behaviors than the group of individuals who are highly knowl-
edgeable about the consequences of the behaviors."); supra notes 82-85 and accompany-
ing text.
231 Note that the advocates of greater investments in education, discussed supra notes
64, 67-68 and accompanying text, advanced a different causal mechanism.
232 See George Loewenstein & Dazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence
and Interpretation, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 223, at 119, 124-31 (describing a behav-
ioral model for intemporal choice); Hersh M. Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral
Life-Cycle Hypothesis, in QtJAsi RATIONAL ECON. 91, 92-101 (1991) (distinguishing between
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focuses on financial investment and consumer spending behavior.
2
"3
Aside from the Fuchs studies, which developed crude metrics for pa-
tience as it relates to health behaviors, there has been little research
investigating how farsightedness affects health and whether certain
psychosocial factors-other possible S-goods-have a systematic rela-
tionship with personal discount rates. Nonetheless, some empirical
evidence does shed light onto some possible concrete expressions of
S-goods and suggests that certain interventions could improve health
by inducing farsightedness.
a. Self Control and Hyperbolic Discounting
Psychologists have a rich history of discussing self-defeating be-
haviors, and recent findings by experimental psychologists and econo-
mists have added to that history the phenomena of hyperbolic
discounting.29 4 Hyperbolic discounting expresses itself in two forms:
first, a pervasive and excessive discounting of the future, and second, a
dynamically inconsistent discount rate, where individuals discount the
immediate future more heavily than subsequent transitions in time.
2 5
Psychologists have also identified certain coping strategies and mental
heuristics that humans develop to combat destructive discounting ten-
dencies, such as developing self-control mechanisms and commitment
devices that force individuals to divert resources towards investments
that enhance future wealth and improve future utility.2 3 6 Other meth-
ods individuals use to prevent self-destructive behavior are more coer-
cive-coined "self-commanding"-but serve similar functions.
23 7
These mental heuristics resemble the spirit underlying the S-
goods. To the degree that commitment devices can help individuals
short-run and long-run behavior); Richard H. Thaler & Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic
Theory of Self-Control, 89J. POL. EcoN. 392 (1981), reprinted in QuAsi RATIONAL ECON. 77, 88
(1991) (proposing a "multiself model of man"-doer versus planner-to explain the prob-
lem of intemporal choice).
233 See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERI-
MENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 674-76 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) (reviewing
studies of economic behavior in various markets).
234 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME,
supra note 223, at 57, 59-62, 71-74 (giving an overview of hyperbolic discounting and self-
defeating behavior literature).
235 See Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS
201, 205 (1981).
236 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Self-Control, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note
223, at 177, 178-85; T. C. Schelling, Self-Command: A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIME,
supra note 223, at 167, 173-76; Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 232.
237 One example of self-commanding is a drug addict who writes a letter addressed to
his boss admitting that he has a drug addiction. The addict then gives this letter to a
colleague with instructions to send the letter if the colleague should ever see the addict
under the influence of illegal substances. See Schelling, supra note 236, at 167-68. Other
examples include Christmas clubs that force savings for holiday shopping. See Thaler &
Shefrin, supra note 232, at 77-78.
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behave more optimally in making investments in future utilities, Medi-
caid policy should develop rules that serve the same functions. For
example, studies indicate that low-income individuals are less likely to
obtain recommended preventative screenings and child immuniza-
tions.238 The evidence from the self-control literature suggests that
Medicaid could consider mandating these sorts of screenings. Per-
haps Medicaid policy should require individuals to show that they
have received appropriate medical screenings in order to renew their
driver's licenses. Similar rules could require other important but
often delayed health care measures, such as child immunizations,
which the poor have also underutilized. 23 9 A less coercive but simi-
larly motivated approach would involve carrots, not sticks, to induce
individuals to seek necessary health care. Perhaps distributing gift
certificates for diapers or children's toys during immunizations or pe-
riodic check-ups would encourage desirable healthcare-seeking
behavior.
Note that there is an important difference between a finding of
hyperbolic discounting and an assertion of exogenous high discount
rates. The latter justifies prescribing certain behaviors only if un-
healthy behaviors produce costly externalities since forcing healthy
behaviors onto shortsighted individuals may actually decrease the sum
of their expected utility. Characterizing shortsightedness as hyper-
bolic discounting, however, suggests that mandating farsighted ac-
tions is actually a utility-increasing behavior because the individual is
better off if forced to make long-term investments. Consequently, the
hyperbolic discounting perspective suggests that there is ajustification
for a Medicaid intervention.
Unfortunately, mental heuristics and commitment devices, de-
spite their success in inducing farsighted behavior, do not actually fit
into the Becker and Mulligan model as S-goods. They may induce
utility-increasing behavior across time, but they are merely coercive
devices that force desirable behavior; they do not themselves increase
a preference for future utility. The search for S-goods must move be-
yond simple heuristics.
b. Integrated Health Care
Becker and Mulligan propose that education-specifically, for-
mal schooling-is one type of S-good.2 40 They argue that formal
schooling promotes farsightedness because it forces students to focus
238 See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 128, at 2874.
239 See Janet Currie & Duncan Thomas, Does Head Start Make a Difference?, 85 AMER.
ECON. REv. 341, 360 (1995) (finding children that attended Head Start were more likely to
have received needed immunizations).
240 Becker & Mulligan, supra note 218, at 735-36.
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on the future and consider specific situations and difficulties of life.2 41
A similar, and more precise, argument could be made with regard to
health care and health education. If health-specific S-goods attune an
individual to the relationship between current actions-either certain
health behaviors or investments in health inputs-and future health,
then they also could induce greater farsightedness and a greater ap-
preciation for future health utility.
This mechanism is notably different from the allocative efficiency
hypothesis. If certain health-related education is an S-good, then such
education does more than simply disseminate information about the
consequences of individuals' behavior. Instead, the education in-
duces a heightened appreciation and greater taste for future health.
This intuitively suggests that health education does not simply deter
smoking by informing an individual that smoking leads to harmful
health outcomes, which is unlikely since smokers are generally aware
of these consequences,2 42 but rather that education impresses upon
individuals the real dangers and consequential suffering that smokers
endure.
If there were such health-specific S-goods,2 43 we would expect to
see better health outcomes from health care providers who supple-
ment their delivery of health care with services that induce contempla-
tion about the future. Some social programs have pursued this
strategy by developing integrative systems for health care delivery. For
example, Head Start, a federal program designed to improve chil-
dren's learning skills, social skills, and health status, supplements its
provision of childcare, early childhood education, and child medical
services with counseling and education for poor parents. 244 Enrollees
enjoy a comprehensive delivery of health care, education, and
messages encouraging forward thinking. And consistent with the
Becker-Mulligan model, Head Start attendees exhibit better health
outcomes. Graduates enjoy better health, and parents of graduates
are more likely to seek recommended immunizations for their chil-
241 Id.
242 See Viscusi, supra note 85, at 83 (noting that risk perceptions of smoking for lung
cancer risks are in fact overestimated).
243 One reviewer, in noting this lengthy discussion of hypothetical S-goods, urged the
explicit reminder that we really do not know what S-goods are, or if they even exist. While
this is merely admitting the obvious, the length of this discussion-prompted by the rich-
ness of the Becker and Muiligan model-requires its repetition.
244 See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE NATION'S INVESTMENT IN CHILDREN 39-40
(1991) (describing the program's goals); Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Services, Head Start: A Comprehensive Child Development Program (describing the dif-
ferent componants of the program -eared toward parents), at http://www.headstartinfo.
org/recruitment/cdp.htm.
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dren. 245 In contrast, a much smaller fraction of children on Medicaid
receive adequate screening, preventive care, and immunizations.2 46
An examination of an innovative Medicaid Extension Demonstra-
tion program in 1989 found similar results. 247 This pilot program pro-
vided additional funds to Maine, Michigan, and Florida to experiment
with creative approaches to providing health care coverage to low-in-
come children. 248 Each state selected a different strategy: Maine ad-
ded funds to its existing Medicaid infrastructure, Michigan funded
health care coverage through a private indemnity program operated
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield, and Florida experimented with a
school-based insurance program with outreach through the school
lunch program and a private managed care contractor.2 4 9
The results were striking. Unlike the Maine and Michigan pro-
grams, which exhibited little success in improving health care utiliza-
tion or outcomes, 250 Florida beneficiaries sought routine care at
significantly higher levels, utilized hospital emergency rooms less, and
enjoyed substantially greater health outcomes than their Florida coun-
terparts who were not enrolled in the program. 251 The Florida pro-
gram's accomplishments were largely attributed to its health
education seminars, provision of a steady health care source, and abil-
245 See Currie & Thomas, supra note 239, at 359-61 (finding improved immunization
rates and reduced likihood of grade repetition among Head Start enrollees); Id. at 343
(describing other studies' findings of lower teen pregnancy rates and reduced prison rates
among Head Start enrollees); Eliana Garces et al., Longer-Term Effects of Head Start, 92 AMER.
ECON. REV. 999, 1007 tbl. 2 (2002) (showing that African Americans who attended Head
Start were less likely than African Americans from other preschools to be booked or
charged with a crime); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES, BUILDING THEIR
FuruREs: How EARLY HEAD START PROGRAMAS ARE ENHANCING THE LIVEs OF INFANTS AND
TOOLERS IN LOW-INCOME FAMILIES, SUMMARY REPORT 12-13 (2001) (finding the program to
have a positive impact on a wide range of child development indicia and parental skills),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/core/ongoingresearch/elis/ehs reports.
html#gov; Garces et al., supra, at 1011 (supporting the view that "Head Start participants
gain social and economic benefits that persist into adulthood"). All of these resulting be-
haviors are consistent with an increase in preferences for future utilities.
246 See Currie & Thomas, supra note 239, at 359-61; see also KATE IRISH ET AL., CENTER
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, HEAD START COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES: A KEY SUPPORT FOR
EARLY LEARNING FOR POOR CHILDREN 1 (2004) (compiling data showing Head Start enroll-
ees were more likely to receive screening for medical conditions, immunizations and den-
tal care than poor children generally), available at http://www.clasporg/publications/
HSbrf_4.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005); Hanil R. Harris, Vaccines Don t Reach Poor Children:
More Than Half Get Too Few Shots, WASH. PosT,June 17, 1993, at D.C. 8 (noting that in 1993
more than half of the children born to parents on Medicaid in Washington D.C. did not
get all of their needed immunization shots).
247 See Margo L. Rosenbach et al., Access for Low-Income Children: Is Health Insurance
Enough?, 103 PEDIATRICS 1167, 1173-74 (1999).
248 See id. at 1167-87.
249 See id. at 1169-70.
250 See id. at 1173.
251 See id. at 1173-74.
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ity to establish consistent relationships between providers and enroll-
ees. 252 The study concluded that:
Providing a health insurance card through a traditional [fee-for-ser-
vice] program, whether a Medicaid-type program or a commercial
indemnity plan, is simply not enough to ensure access to care for
low-income children. Providing a medical home, educating families
about the appropriate use of the ER, and offering after-hours care
in alternative settings are some of the key factors associated with
[the Florida program's] success. 253
The key features of the Florida program can be viewed as species of S-
goods-supplementary services that induce individuals to seek pre-
ventive care and develop ongoing communication between providers
and patients. The Florida program appeared to succeed because the
administering body was able to offer an integrative approach to health
care by combining the delivery of health services with school-based
outreach and educational counseling. Much like Head Start, it sup-
plied a comprehensive intervention. 254
None of this evidence is conclusive, and S-goods remain more of
a theoretical construct than a concrete commodity. Nonetheless, the
common theme underlying the success of these social programs is
their provision of support, education, and counseling alongside
health care. These programs appear to induce more forward-thinking
health behavior, such as seeking immunizations and preventive care.
Still, policymakers are left to their own creativity in developing ser-
vices that deliver useful S-goods. The programs discussed here sug-
gest that a synthesis of health care with relevant counseling and
educational seminars resembles the provision of S-goods. A looser
view might consider a doctor's visit itself to be an S-good since it is a
device that communicates health information, such as education and
vivid images of adverse health consequences of certain behaviors, that
forces future-oriented thinking. Thus, there may be a long-term bene-
fit, beyond immediate medical care, of encouraging regular doctor's
visits. Like the administrators of the Florida program, policymakers
could find some benefits in moving away from the standard provision
252 See id. at 1174.
253 Id. The utility of a medical home and integrated health care delivery also lends
support to the allocative and the productive efficiency models. The allocative efficiency
model predicts that individuals will improve their health behaviors and seek healthcare
more effectively the more informed and educated they become. See supra Part II.A. 1. The
Florida program's results indicate that beneficiaries exhibited these improvements after
receiving counseling and attending health education seminars. See Rosenbach et al., supra
note 247, at 1174. The productive efficiency model states that healthcare consumption
becomes more effective if complemented by accompanying services, such as counseling,
education, and trustworthy relationships with physicians. See supra Part III.A.2. The Flor-
ida results support this as well. See Rosenbach et al., supra note 247, at 1174.
25 4 See supra note 244.
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of health insurance and instead develop creative interventions that
impart future-oriented priorities.
One needs to realize, however, that such a comprehensive ap-
proach may involve a much more costly model for the provision of
health care. For example, Currie and Thomas, in asking what they
called "the $2.2 billion question," compare Head Start's price tag of
$3,500 per enrollee to Medicaid's $468.255 The Florida program also
benefited from additional federal funds, though probably at a lower
per-enrollee cost than Head Start.256 Nonetheless, the evidence cited
is sufficiently compelling that Medicaid policymakers should consider
comprehensive and integrated systems of health care delivery, even
though the program operates under an extremely tight budget.2 5 7
3. Summary: Time Preferences and Health
Models of intertemporal choice suggest that a discount rate is an
important factor in predicting health behavior. Consequently, policy-
makers should seriously consider strategies that can induce farsighted-
ness, which in turn encourages investments in health care. An
exogenous model of time preferences leaves policymakers with few
suggestions other than to mandate farsighted behavior, and even that
may not be a utility-enhancing strategy. The Becker and Mulligan ap-
proach, alternatively, suggests that health care interventions can shape
an individual's discounting of the future, but the challenge their
model leaves is in identifying the goods or environmental influences
that induce stronger preferences for future utility.
Medicaid policymakers may find fewer concrete policy sugges-
tions in this Section as compared to the previous discussion, but there
still are some potential lessons. Heuristics and mandated self-control
devices, while not directly affecting time preferences, may induce
more efficient health investment behaviors. Consequently, there may
be some benefit to mandating periodic doctor's visits, disease screen-
ings, or, more intrusively, exercise. Medicaid policies may further
255 Currie & Thomas, supra note 239, at 361.
256 See Rosenbach et al., supra note 247, at 1167.
257 There is an interesting tension between the thrust of this Section, which seeks to
encourage individuals to make appropriate investments in health care, and the previous
Section, supra Part Ill.A, which suggests that nonmedical interventions deserve more em-
phasis and traditional healrhcare deserves less. Reconciling the two sections requires dis-
tinguishing between the need to provide the unhealthy with preventative care versus the
ineffectiveness of health insurance and medical care without supplemental services. See
Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 128, at 2874 (describing a "strong association" of
lack of insurance and lack of preventative care and also finding that "patterns of health
insurance coverage" seem to direct preventative services away from those who need it
most). Though traditional health care may be less important than commonly believed, it
cannot be wholly replaced, and the apparent tension highlights the potential value of an
integrative health care system. I thank Sharon Dolovich for raising this issue.
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profit from adopting a comprehensive approach toward health care
delivery, where beneficiaries have access to educational and counsel-
ing services-or other benefits that capture the essence of S-goods-
to accompany their medical treatment.
The central theme throughout these models and their support-
ing evidence is that the simple approach of providing health insur-
ance is not an optimal strategy. There are accompanying behavioral
factors, albeit difficult to identify, that significantly affect the value of
health care interventions. A skeptic might dismiss this approach as
merely substituting unobservable time preferences at the beginning of
the causal chain with unidentifiable S-goods, and this critique reflects
the need for more research into the Becker and Mulligan model and
the identification of S-goods.2 58 Nonetheless, the difficulty in identify-
ing the specific behavioral variables does not discount their impor-
tance. Traditional economic analysis fails to account for these
important variables, suggesting that a behavioral economic approach,
though certainly messier, has great potential for policy
recommendations.
IV
AVAILABLE AVENUES FOR REFORM
While the specific policy reforms suggested in the previous Part
are largely speculative, they invoke new approaches to Medicaid re-
form that appreciate the behavioral features of health care consump-
tion. These reforms urge a significant departure from current health
care policy, which responds to poor health and health care needs by
simply expanding insurance programs. A better approach to Medi-
caid reform is to develop creative programs that intertwine medical
and non-medical interventions. Indeed, the preliminary evidence
from the Medicaid Extension Demonstration program suggests that
such an integrated approach to health care can incorporate social and
community features into health care delivery-features that the
health psychology and public health literatures deem so important 259
Other evidence from health psychology implies that integrating
health care with nonmedical resources could both increase the effi-
cacy of any provided medical care and have a greater impact on
health outcomes than medical care would have on its own.
258 Grossman himself considers the Becker and Mulligan model to offer exciting pos-
sibilities for future research. See Grossman, Human Capital, supra note 47, at 401-04
(describing the Becker-Mulligan approach to understanding addiction); Grossman & Ka-
esther, supra note 64, at 92-93 (describing the Becker-Mulligan approach to understand-
ing parental attitudes towards their children's health).
259 See Rosenbach et al., supra note 247, at 1173-74.
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To pursue such a pioneering approach, however, states must
reconfigure their Medicaid programs to move away from traditional
fee-for-service coverage and toward more creative delivery systems.
While, like any other reform, states could accomplish such a recon-
figuration through major legislation, there are at least three existing
policy mechanisms that can introduce policy reforms without major
legislative restructuring.
A. Section 1115 Waivers
Normally, states must comply with strict standards to qualify for
federal Medicaid funds. 260 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act,
however, grants the Secretary of Health and Human Services the au-
thority to waive certain federal requirements for state programs if the
programs pursue the underlying legislative objectives of the Act.261
Thus, Section 1115 waivers permit states to use federal Medicaid fund-
ing for research, demonstration, or innovative health care projects
without being tightly bound to federal requirements. 262
While Section 1115 has long provided states with the opportunity
to seek Medicaid waivers, the Health Insurance Flexibility and Ac-
countability Initiative (HIFA), an executive order announced by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) in August 2001,
promulgated new waiver guidelines that strongly encourage states to
seek waivers. 263 A state obtaining a waiver may, within budget neutral-
ity restrictions, devise its own strategy toward providing health care to
low-income individuals and pursue creative interventions without be-
ing constrained by Medicaid's traditional medical paradigm. 264
Through Section 1115 waivers, states can move away from simple
insurance expansions and may instead pursue social policies that ap-
26 See supra note 6.
261 See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2000); KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, SECTION 1115 MEDICAID AND SCHIP WAVERS:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT AcrlvriY 1 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/medi-
caid/4121-index.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
262 See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYj. KAISER FA-
ILY FOUNDATION, SECTION 1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH
INSURANCE PROGRAMa: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2001) (describing Section 1115 as "unprecedented
in its sweep" of authority), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4001-index.cfm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2005)
263 42 C.F.R. § 457 (2003); see also KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNIN-
SURED, supra note 261, at 1; Fact Sheet, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Health
Insurance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) Demonstration Initiative, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hifa/default.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
264 While the availability of waivers creates valuable opportunities to devise useful and
innovative health programs, some states have used the waiver program instead to reduce
their own expenditures on health care programs or to channel federal funds away from
low-income beneficiaries and towald other populations. See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDI-
CAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 261, at 1-2.
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preciate the behavioral component of health care consumption.
265
Medicaid waivers have already enabled some states to develop innova-
tive health care approaches. For example, Oregon obtained a Section
1115 waiver in the early 1990s to redesign its Medicaid program.2 6
6
The Oregon Health Plan rejected a standard system based on entitle-
ments and instead invested state funds and federal matching dollars
into expanded coverage and preventive care that has the broadest pos-
sible impact.267 Another state program under Section 1115 receiving
praise is Tennessee's "TennCare,"2 68 which has redirected federal dol-
lars into low-cost community-based programs that have improved
health outcomes on several measures. 269 Section 1115 waivers have
now been granted to nineteen states and the District of Columbia,
including many new approvals and extensions since HIFA was an-
nounced in 2001,270 and additional SCHIP Section 1115 demonstra-
tion projects have received CMS approval for fifteen states. 271 This
265 For an example of social policy that appreciates the behavioral component of
health care consumption, see Rosenbach et al., supra note 247. See also Lisa Dubay &
Genevieve Kenney, Health Care Access and Use Among Low-Income Children: vho Fares Best?, 20
HEALTH AFt. 112, 112, 117-19 (2001) (recognizing that "[e]xpanding public coverage may
not be sufficient to ensure that all low-income children have access to comprehensive and
high-quality care").
266 See Fact Sheet, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Oregon Statewide Health
Reform Demonstration, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/1115/orfact.asp
(last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
267 See Martin A. Strosberg, Introduction, in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE
OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 3, 3-5 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992) (describing the
broad contours of the Oregon plan); Jean I. Thorne, The Oregon Approach to Comprehensive
and Rational Health Care, in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE ORECON PLAN AND
BEYOND, supra, at 24, 28-30. Many have criticized the Oregon plan for its explicit rationing
of care. See, e.g., Stephen M. Ayres, Rationality, Not Rationing in Health Care, in RATIONING
AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND, supra, at 132. While ethicists are
divided on the permissibility of rationing, see, e.g., CALLAHAN, supra note 20, at 20-26,
health policy experts generally agree that Oregon's effort to invest its Medicaid dollars into
services that have the broadest social impact is one that states would do well to follow.
268 See TennCare Reform Act of 2002, 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 880 (codified as amended
in scattered parts of TENN. CODE ANN. § 71), available at http://www.tennessee.gov/tenn-
care/Reformbill.pdf/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2005); Christopher J. Conover & Hester H. Da-
vies, The Role of TennCare in Health Policy for Low-Income People in Tennessee 24-25, 52-53
(Urban Institute, Occasional Paper No. 33, Feb. 2000), available at http://www.urban.org/
UpdatedPDF/occa33.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
269 SeeJames F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Health Care Reform Through Medicaid Man-
aged Care: Tennessee (TennCare) as a Case Study and a Paradigm, 53 VAND. L. REV. 125, 135-36
(2000) (summarizing the generally positive data on TennCare's impact).
270 CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, SECTION 115 HEALTH CARE REFORM
DEMONSTRATIONS (providing a comprehensive list of current Medicaid waivers and waiver
applications), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/1115/statesum.pdf (last vis-
ited Jan. 1, 2005).
271 See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE (SCHIP) APPROVED SECrION 1115 DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 1-4, available at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/stateplans/waivers/ 1115waivers.pdf (last updated Nov. 17, 2004).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
pattern of granting Section 1115 waivers suggests that Medicaid re-
forms will likely rely on state experimentation.
The efficacy of this new wave of Medicaid experiments has yet to
be determined (though CMS reporting requirements should produce
valuable evaluation data soon), but some early successes are consistent
with the behavioral approach outlined here. The Florida initiatives
under the Medicaid Extension Demonstration program suggest that
innovative programs can yield substantial results, and the Oregon
Health Plan and TennCare reflect the efficacy of certain low-cost,
community-based heath initiatives. This Article, and the broad litera-
tures it cites, strongly suggests that policy innovations should continue
this move away from programs that rest exclusively on medical care.
B. State Children's Health Insurance Program
The State Children's Health Insurance Program, 272 passed by
Congress as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,273 dedicated $40
billion in federal funding over 10 years to provide health coverage for
low-income children.2 74 Unlike previous public insurance expan-
sions, which were merely built upon existing Medicaid programs and
made low-income children eligible for certain medical care on a fee-
for-service basis, SCHIP provides states with considerable latitude in
selecting a health insurance policy strategy.27 5 States may simply fol-
low previous expansions of Medicaid, design new health insurance
programs that mimic the cost sharing and benefit packages typical of
private plans, or build new programs that augment insurance plans
with accompanying services. 276
SCHIP grants states unusual flexibility in their use of federal dol-
lars. States may set their own eligibility requirements and fund pro-
272 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397 aa-1397ji (2000).
273 Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
274 See 42 U.S.C § 1397dd (2000); Fact Sheet, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Ser-
vices, Welcome to the State Children's Health Insurance Program ("SCHIP is the single
largest expansion of health insurance coverage for children since the initiation of Medi-
caid in the mid-1960s."), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/about-SCHIP.asp.
275 See Robert F. Rich et al., Symposium, The State Children's Health Insurance Program:
An Administrative Experiment in Federalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 107, 110-116 (contrasting
Medicaid as a "prime example of the old, traditional model of [federal-state] cooperation"
with the flexibility of SCHIP as a "new form of cooperative federalism"). This more flexi-
ble approach follows, in part, the strategy employed in the much smaller and selective
Medicaid Extension Demonstration program, authorized by Congress in 1989. See
Rosenbach et al., supra note 247, at 1167.
276 See Rich et al., supra note 275, at 116 ("[SItates have full discretion in deciding
which providers may participate in the program, what delivery system will be used to pro-
vide health care benefits, and what procedures to use for monitoring quality of care.");
Barbara J. Zabawa, Making the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability Waiver Work
Through Collaborative Governance, 12 ANN. HEALTH L. 367, 378 (2003) (describing new "col-
laborative governance" ideas for state Medicaid experiments).
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grams that benefit the working poor and low-income individuals who
may not otherwise qualify for AFDC and TANF.277 In addition, fed-
eral funds from SCHIP offer further opportunities for flexibility
under the liberal Section 1115 waiver policy.
2 78
It is unclear how much policy innovation the additional SCHIP
funds have sparked. One recent study by the Urban Institute her-
alded "States as Innovators in Low-Income Health Coverage," but
characterizes the innovations as the extension of insurance benefits to
the previously uninsured rather than as a comprehensive reform to
health care delivery that might address important behavioral issues.
279
But certainly there are opportunities for program creativity, particu-
larly in Medicaid's growing reliance on managed care systems, 280 and
Medicaid administrators should consider the substantial health effects
of psychosocial variables in their future innovations.
C. Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis, and Treatment
In the years after creating Medicaid, Congress augmented the
program's coverage to provide early and periodic screening, diagno-
sis, and treatment (EPSDT) services to Medicaid-eligible children.28 a
Congress designed these revisions to give children access to preventive
health care-such as vision, hearing, and dental services-that pre-
empt the onset of childhood illness and identify children with disabili-
ties in need of early attention.2 2 The EPSDT reforms enacted by
Congress, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1989,283 were particularly noteworthy in two pertinent respects. First,
Congress obligated participating states to provide a comprehensive
277 See FRANK ULLMAN ET AL., THE STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM: A
LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 3-5 (Urban Institute, Assessing the New Federalism, 1998) (describ-
ing the requirements and flexibility for states under the program), available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/occ4.pdf (last visitedJan. 1, 2005);Jonathan R_ Bolton, The
Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to
Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 91, 97 (2003) (noting that
SCHIP allows states to cover low-income children who may not be eligible for Medicaid
and critiquing the "strong incentives" for states to use their SCHIP allotments to expand
coverage rather than Medicaid).
278 See KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 262, at 5
(describing standards for 1115 waivers under SCHIP); Rich et al. supra note 275, at 122.
279 JOHN HoLAHA, & MARY BETH POHL, STATES AS INNOVAORS IN LOW-INCOME HEALTH
CoV-CRAGF 33-37 (Urban Institute, Assessing the New Federalism, 2002), available at http:/
/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310519_DPO208.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
280 See ROBERT HURLEY & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: STATE FLEXI-
BILITY IN AcnoN 7-12 (Urban Institute, Assessing the New Federalism, 2002), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310449.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2005).
281 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (10), 1396a(a) (43), 1396d(a) (4) (B), 1396d(r) (5) (2000).
282 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, at 395-401 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1906, 2121-27; S. Rep. No. 90-744, at pt. II-G (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834,
2869-71.
283 Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
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package of preventive services that met reasonable standards of medi-
cal necessity,28 4 and second, Congress expanded EPSDT services to
include "[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treat-
ment, and other measures described [as medical assistance] to correct
or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions
discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are
covered under the State plan."2 8 5 In effect, these amendments re-
quired states to provide Medicaid coverage for any medical service
"identified as necessary through the EPSDT program. '28 6
In recent years, federal courts-prodded by aggressive advocates
for the poor-have become the forum where useful EPSDT policy is
made. Most litigation involves advocates suing state officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to deliver "medically necessary" health care services, as
the statute requires. 28 7 However, some rulings have held that states
must play proactive roles in health care delivery, such as administering
outreach programs to screen at-risk children for health dangers and
deliver preventative care. For example, in 2002 the Eighth Circuit "re-
minded" the State of Arkansas that it was required by law to inform
Medicaid beneficiaries of their entitlements.28 8 In an earlier case, the
Seventh Circuit deemed Indiana's screening system inadequate be-
cause it did little to reach out to Medicaid beneficiaries and bring
them into the state's health care system. 2 9
If states assume, or are judicially required to assume, responsibil-
ity to play a proactive role in delivering preventative health care, then
there would be a significant role for behavioral considerations.
Health and social psychological data can inform information cam-
paigns to enroll individuals and induce adherence to reasonable pre-
ventative regimens. More importantly, EPSDT outreach affords an
opportunity to integrate health care delivery with other social services.
284 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (43), 1396d(r).
285 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (5).
286 135 Cong. Rec. S6900 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
287 See, e.g., Collins v. Hamilton, 349 F.3d 371, 372 (7th Cir. 2003); Pittman v. Sec.
Florida Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 998 F.2d 887, 889 (lth Cir. 1993); Pereira v.
Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 724 (4th Cir. 1993).
288 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 293 F.3d 472, 481 (8th
Cir. 2002) (
Finally, we remind the state that it has a duty under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(43)
to inform Medicaid recipients about the EPSDT services that are available
to them and that it must arrange for the corrective treatments prescribed
by physicians. The state may not shirk its responsibilities to Medicaid recip-
ients by burying information about available services in a complex bureau-
cratic scheme.
289 Bond v. Stanton, 655 F.2d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 1981) ("In short, we conclude that
Indiana has still not complied with this court's mandate that 'EPSDT' programs must be
brought to the recipients." (quoting Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1251 (7th Cir.
1974))).
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Such outreach could constitute a valuable dialogue on health between
state actors and low-income individuals who are at risk of suffering
from poor health.
In sum, Section 1115 waivers, SCHIP demonstration projects, and
EPSDT programs are all avenues that offer opportunities to incorpo-
rate the lessons of behavioral health research. While some states are
taking these opportunities seriously, and some have even pursued pol-
icy reforms that incorporate the important role of psychosocial issues
in health, these mechanisms remain mostly unexplored and un-
derutilized in pursuing reforms that pay heed to behavioralism. But
the opportunities are wide open, as the three mechanisms offer a va-
ried menu for reform-minded policymakers: Section 1115 waivers and
SCHIP projects grant flexibility to innovative administrators, while
EPSDT actions open possibilities for public and private advocates.
These programs also suggest a role for each branch of the federal
government in reforming Medicaid policy: HIFA indicates the execu-
tive branch's enthusiasm for flexibility, SCHIP reflects Congress's ap-
preciation for experimentation, and EPSDT signifies the judicial
branch's duty to ensure that states play proactive roles in delivering
preventative care. These programs present genuine opportunities for
Medicaid to invest public funds in the policy proposals suggested
throughout this Article and to move four decades of Medicaid policy
into a more useful, multi-tooled paradigm. Perhaps more significant,
these alternative mechanisms offer states opportunities to experiment.
While devising successful programs will certainly take time and creativ-
ity, policymakers should heed the lessons from combining economics
with health psychology and depart from the traditional insurance-
based strategy.
CONCLUSION
The consideration of behavioral variables for Medicaid reform
rests on the intersection of a valuable economic model and years of
useful research in health psychology. The Grossman model-the
leading model in health economics-has served as a foundation for
many empirical examinations that estimate health outcomes from eco-
nomic data and one psychosocial variable: education. This Article
suggests that consulting research in health psychology and intertem-
poral decision theory can allow the Grossman model to incorporate a
broad variety of additional psychosocial factors and further explicate
the relationship between personal variables and health outcomes.
These results are particularly useful to Medicaid policymakers,
who largely have neglected psychosocial variables in implementing a
health insurance program that rests chiefly on- orthodox economic as-
sumptions. And these results are also tremendously important for
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public health in the United States. Medicaid has become "the work-
horse of the U.S. health system" 290 and has been "called upon to solve
all manner of health-related problems that no other institution or sec-
tor of the economy is willing to address."29 1 Creative use of Medi-
caid's considerable funds, and addressing the real policy challenge of
health disparities, rather than health insurance disparities, would
bring significant benefits to both Medicaid beneficiaries and taxpay-
ers. This Article questions the efficacy of Medicaid's current course,
and it offers a host of behavioral factors that help determine health
outcomes and deserve a role in Medicaid policy. Policymakers should
avoid paying exclusive attention to the expansion of health care insur-
ance, despite the loud political calls, and instead direct their efforts
and resources toward understanding the impact of psychosocial issues
on health.
290 Alan Weil, There's Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AF. 13, 15 (2003).
291 Id. at 20.
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